Rawls and Contract Law by Kordana, Kevin A. & Blankfein-Tabachnick, David H.
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
2005
Rawls and Contract Law
Kevin A. Kordana
David H. Blankfein-Tabachnick
Michigan State University College of Law, dbt@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 598, 632 (2005).
Rawls and Contract Law 
Kevin A. Kordana* & David H. Tabachnick** 
Table of Contents 
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 598 
I. Primary Goods and the Problem of the Basic Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 601 
II. Contract Law and the Basic Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 607 
Ill. Contract Law and the First Principle of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 608 
IV. Conceptions of Contract Law and the Difference Principle.......... 614 
V. Inside the Basic Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 620 
VI. The Objection from Democracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 623 
VII. Application: Unconscionability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 626 
VIII. Contract Law and the Opportunity Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 629 
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 632 
Introduction 
The conventional view of Rawlsian political philosophy is that the pri-
vate law lies outside the scope of the two principles of justice-it is not part 
of the "basic structure" of society, which, in this view, is limited to basic con-
stitutional liberties and the state's system of tax and transfer. This narrow 
view of the basic structure invites the conclusion that Rawlsian political phi-
losophy is neutral with respect to the private law. In this narrow view, the 
private law is plausibly understood to operate in Rawlsian political philoso-
phy (if it is to exist at all) independent of the two principles of justice.1 
Consider, for example, the contemporary debate over the ex ante and ex 
post conceptions of contract law. The ex post conception (i.e., autonomy or 
"will" theory) typically understands contract law as a unified and distinct 
body of law. According to Charles Fried, for example, contracts are uniquely 
based upon the moral notion of a promise.2 For the autonomy theorist, given 
the absence of procedural defects, a promise is necessary and sufficient for 
* Nicholas E. Chimicles Research Professor in Business Law and Regulation, University 
of Virginia School of Law. 
** Fellow, Institute for Practical Ethics, University of Virginia. 
We would like to thank John G. Bennett, Neil Duxbury, Gregory Keating, Alana Malick, 
John Marshall, Terrance O'Reilly, Thomas Pogge, Ariel Porat, Eric A. Posner, Robert Rasmus-
sen, George Rutherglen, A. John Simmons, and Steven Walt for comments on a previous draft; 
Jules L. Coleman and Loren Lomasky for valuable discussions; and participants in faculty work-
shops at the University of Virginia and George Washington University law schools. 
1 For example, in his contribution to the recent Rawls and the Law Symposium, Arthur 
Ripstein takes as an assumption, based upon his reading of the Rawlsian texts, that contract law 
lies outside the basic structure. Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of 
Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 1811, 1813 (2004). He goes on to argue that tort law, analogously, 
must be conceived as lying outside the basic structure and that it is governed by some principles 
other than the two principles of justice. Id. ("I will argue that the same line of reasoning [as 
applies to the rules of contract] requires that we also conceive of tort Jaw as governing transac-
tions between private parties, albeit involuntary ones."). 
2 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 
17 (1981). 
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contractual obligation-and this is what is distinctive about contract law. In 
this view, the standard of justice or fairness by which contracts are to be 
evaluated is endogenous to the terms of the contract-the will of the parties 
defines the conception of justice. For the autonomy theorist, barring proce-
dural defects, contracts are understood as fair because they embody the will 
of the parties. 
On the other hand, the ex ante view, both in the economic efficiency 
conception attributed to Richard Posner3 and in the distributive justice con-
ception attributed to Anthony Kronman,4 conceives of contract law as serv-
ing a particular independent social value. In this view, justice or fairness in 
contracts is to be evaluated on terms exogenous to the will of the consenting 
parties. Such standards as utility, distributive justice, or economic efficiency 
are understood as duty imposing, despite the fact that they do not arise from 
the will of the contracting parties.5 
Recall that if the narrow view of the basic structure is correct, Rawslian-
ism swings clear of this debate over conceptions of contract law. In the nar-
row view, the two principles of justice simply do not apply to the private law: 
the private law is not understood to be subject to the two principles of justice. 
One might reasonably infer that, in this view, Rawlsianism is neutral with 
respect to the debate over conceptions of contract law. 
Interestingly, this conventional (or narrow) view of the basic structure, 
in which the private law embodies no equity-oriented distributive aims, has 
tempted scholars with law and economics commitments to argue that, 
counterintuitively, Rawlsians may as well embrace the wealth-maximization 
approach to the various areas of private law (e.g., contract, tort, and bank-
ruptcy).6 Their argument is that the wealth-maximization approach to these 
areas of private law will ultimately lead to maximal wealth creation that 
would be subject to (re)distribution via a system of tax and transfer. This, in 
turn, will best satisfy the demands of the two principles of justice.7 This in-
vites the unlikely conclusion that Rawlsians and law and economics scholars 
alike ought to adopt the wealth-maximization approach to the private law. 
Equity-oriented distributive aims are to be achieved, not via the rules of the 
private law, but only through tax and transfer. This conclusion, of course, is 
3 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 93-141 (6th ed. 2002). 
4 See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 
(1980). 
s Consider, for example, the exogenous standard(s) embodied in statutes forbidding the 
performance of (and, therefore, the contracting over) physician-assisted suicide, Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728, 731-32 (1997) (upholding constitutionality of ban and pointing to 
both legal tradition and (as a matter of distributive justice) concerns about the poor), or laws 
that ban contracting over certain forms of human tissue, see Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for 
Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REv. 163 (2000). 
6 See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Jus-
tice, 1994 U. ILL L. REV. 1, 40 (suggesting that a Rawlsian "would enact an economically-de-
rived bankruptcy regime rather than current law"). 
7 Indeed, Rawls himself justifies the selection of the difference principle over perfect 
equality on the grounds that the introduction of certain forms of inequality may "make everyone 
better off," which seems to imply some affinity with at least aspects of the argument in the text 
above. JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusncE 62 (1971). 
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predicated on the assumption that the rules of the private law are not them-
selves subject to the two principles of justice (i.e., the claim that the private 
law lies outside the basic structure). 
If, however, as we argue, the narrow view is incorrect and the private 
law is properly understood as subject to the two principles of justice, it no 
longer follows that the two principles of justice are best met by applying the 
wealth-maximization approach to the private law. Assuming the private law 
is subject to the two principles of justice, some of its rules (e.g., minimum 
wage laws, the unconscionability doctrine, and some aspects of bankruptcy) 
might be constructed to aid in meeting the demands of the two principles of 
justice. If this is correct, (re )distribution need not be done exclusively 
through tax and transfer, and the conclusion that Rawlsians ought to be com-
mitted to the law and economics approach to the private law should be 
rejected. 
In what follows, we argue that the view of the private law as lying 
outside the bounds of the basic structure is ultimately incoherent. In our 
view, private ordering, specifically contract law, must be viewed as subject to 
the demands of the two principles of justice. For us, Rawlsian political phi-
losophy, properly understood, is not neutral over conceptions of private or-
dering. For Rawlsianism, contract law is properly understood as one of the 
many loci of distributive justice. 
We argue that individual areas of the private law must be constructed-
in conjunction with all other legal and political institutions-in a manner that 
best meets the demands of the two principles of justice. In our view, the 
private law, for Rawlsianism, should not be viewed as separable from other 
areas of law. Despite the confusion in the literature over the narrow view of 
the basic structure, we maintain that the private law is not independent of the 
demands of the principles of justice. We argue that private ordering, for 
Rawlsianism, is properly understood as one component of an entire scheme 
of legal and political institutions. Taken as a whole, this scheme (in compari-
son with all other possible complete schemes of legal and political institu-
tions) best meets the demands of the two principles of justice. 
Importantly, we also argue that our thesis-that contract law is subject 
to the two principles of justice-does not imply that either individual con-
tracts or doctrines of contract law answer directly to the two principles of 
justice. That is to say, individual contracts and rules of contract law need not, 
in our view, pattern themselves after nor be read directly off the principles of 
justice. Instead, we argue that for the Rawlsian, contract law is a matter of 
(re)distribution, consistent with a post-institutional right to freedom of con-
tract. We understand freedom of contract, for Rawlsianism, to be defined as 
the scheme of contracting options constructed as open or free (in the post-
institutional sense) in conjunction with the overall scheme of legal and politi-
cal institutions that, when taken as a whole, best serves the demands of the 
two principles of justice. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Part I, we introduce Rawls's notion of 
primary goods and their distribution via what Rawls terms the basic struc-
ture. First, we attempt to explain Rawls's likely motivation for introducing 
the notion of the basic structure, which (arguably) limits the domain of the 
2005] Rawls and Contract Law 601 
two principles of justice. Second, we introduce the confusion over which in-
stitutions are, in Rawls's view, within the bounds of the basic structure. In 
Part II, we return to the relationship between conceptions of contract law 
and the narrow view of the basic structure. Part III takes up the relationship 
between Rawls's first principle of justice and contract law. Here, we analyze 
whether contract law might be required by Rawls's first principle of justice. 
Next follows Part IV, in which we analyze the relationship between the dif-
ference principle and contract law. We argue for a "broad" conception of the 
basic structure and explain that contractual matters that appear (from the 
inside) to be "free" of state regulation within a Rawlsian scheme are never-
theless within the basic structure. In Part V, we analyze what it means for 
contract law to reside within the basic structure, emphasizing that this does 
not entail that individual contracts or contract doctrines need to pattern the 
difference principle. Part VI takes up an important objection to our view of 
how contract law is to be constructed within a Rawlsian scheme. We raise, 
but ultimately offer a solution to, concerns arising from the role of democ-
racy in Rawlsian political philosophy. Part VII provides an example of how 
our view of Rawlsian contract law might operate by considering the doctrine 
of (substantive) unconscionability. In Part VIII, we consider the relationship 
between the opportunity principle and contract law. Last, we offer our 
conclusion. 
I. Primary Goods and the Problem of the Basic Structure 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls famously argues that his two principles of 
justice are adopted in what he calls the "original position."8 Rawls maintains 
that social institutions are to be constructed in keeping with these two princi-
ples.9 He further argues that the two principles of justice apply only to the 
basic structure of society in its provision of "primary goods. "10 
Primary goods, for Rawls, are those items that, "from the standpoint of 
the original position, it is reasonable for the parties to assume that they want, 
whatever their final ends."11 Primary goods are thus those items that all per-
sons, given Rawls's conception of the reasonable, can be assumed to want, 
independent of their particular desires or conceptions of the good. Impor-
tantly, Rawls's index of the primary goods is an objective standard for assess-
ing competing legal and political schemes.12 Rawls understands primary 
goods as "rights, liberties, and opportunities, income and wealth, and the so-
cial bases of self respect. "13 The theory of the primary goods therefore pro-
vides a metric for the evaluation and design of competing legal and political 
schemes. In constructing legal and political institutions, one is to compare 
8 RAWLS, supra note 7, at 60. 
9 See id. at 54-60. 
JO See id. at 61-62. 
11 JOHN RAWLS, Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, in CoLLEcrED PAPERS 232, 240 (Sa-
muel Freeman ed., 1999). 
12 Id. at 241. For a critique of the use of such an objective standard in distributive justice, 
see, e.g., Richard J. Arneson, Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for 
Welfare, 19 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 158 (1990). 
13 RAwLS, supra note 11, at 241. 
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competing schemes with regard to their provision of primary goods and select 
the scheme that, taken as a whole, maximally satisfies the demands of the two 
principles of justice.14 
While it is clear that competing schemes are to be judged in terms of 
their provision of primary goods, it is less clear what exactly counts as soci-
ety's basic structure. That is to say, it is unclear exactly which social institu-
tions are to be evaluated according to their provision of primary goods and 
designed according to the principles of justice. One might wonder, for exam-
ple, whether private firms (if they are to exist), universities, or hospitals fall 
within the bounds of the basic structure and are thereby subject, in their de-
sign, to the two principles of justice. One might further wonder exactly which 
political and legal institutions are properly understood as directly or indi-
rectly answerable to the demands of the two principles of justice. 
For example, it is clear that Rawls holds that a body of constitutional law 
is required and is properly designed in keeping with the two principles of 
justice. It is much less clear, however, which other legal institutions are re-
quired by the two principles of justice and which legal institutions, even if 
they are not required by the principles of justice, must (if they are to exist) 
conform to the principles of justice. While the two principles of justice do 
not (strictly speaking) require contract law, it is an important question 
whether these legal institutions (if they are to exist) must be understood as 
part of society's basic structure and therefore subject to the demands of the 
two principles of justice.15 
Before answering this question, it is essential to clarify: (1) why Rawls 
introduces the concept of the basic structure; and (2) which institutions con-
stitute the basic structure. Question one is essential to understanding the 
Rawlsian project, while question two is essential to its application. As is the 
case with any maximizing principles, the normative conclusions prescribed 
are a function of the domain over which the principles are applied; the range 
of application of the maximand must thus be specified.16 
14 Of course, the relationship between the demands of the two principles of justice and the 
legal and political institutions they prescribe is mediated by the democratic process, a complica-
tion we address in detail infra Part VI. See JoHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 338-39 (1993). 
15 See John G. Bennett, Ethics and Markets, 14 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 195, 195 & n.3 (1985) 
(contrasting Ronald Dworkin's avoidance of "discussing which resources should be privately 
owned, what the details of the rights of ownership should be, or how those things not privately 
owned should be controlled" (citing Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality?, Part 2: Equality of 
Resources, 10 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 283 (1981)) with Rawls's discussion of the issues (citing John 
Rawls, The Basic Structure as Subject, in VALUES AND MORALS 47-71 (A.I. Goldman & Jaegwon 
Kim eds., 1978)), and commenting that "the(se] issues (that] Dworkin doesn't discuss are consid-
erably more important than the ones he does"). 
16 Analogously, utilitarians must define the proper scope of the utility principle. Some 
commentators have suggested that Bentham understands the scope of the utility principle as 
limited to government action, as opposed to the general conduct of individuals. See Loren 
Lomasky, A Refutation of Utilitarianism, 17 J. VALUE INQUIRY 259, 275 (1983) ("Indeed, in one 
striking passage, Bentham seems to restrict utilitarian calculation exclusively to the political 
sphere."). In the passage to which Lomasky refers, Bentham writes: 
"Let us recapitulate and bring to a point the difference between private ethics, ... 
on the one hand, and that branch of jurisprudence which contains the art or science 
of legislation . . . . Private ethics teaches how each man may dispose himself to 
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We turn first, then, to Rawls's explanation for the focus on the basic 
structure. For Rawls, the domain of the two principles of justice is what he 
calls the "basic structure." Although Rawls is not always clear about what 
exactly constitutes the basic structure, he explains his focus on it and its im-
portance. His explanation begins by discussing what he calls "background 
conditions." Rawls rejects a version of what he takes to be a Lockean view 
of fairness that grounds justice in local or individual consensual relations be-
tween persons. Rawls rejects this purported Lockean view because what he 
calls "background justice" is a necessary condition of complete social jus-
tice.17 For Rawls, fairness cannot be viewed locally-that is, as merely a mat-
ter of the relationship between individual persons conducting private 
transactions. Justice is to be viewed instead from what he calls the "social 
point of view."18 Whether social justice obtains is a matter, for example, of 
whether or not there has been fairness of opportunity that extends "back-
ward in time and well beyond any limited view" of individual transactions. 19 
For Rawls these background conditions are crucial to determining the 
justice of particular or individual transactions. Claims of justice are not (as 
he seems to think the Lockean view suggests) simply a matter of informed 
consensual transactions between persons but instead must be defined, in 
pursue the course most conducive to his own happiness, by means of such motives 
as offer of themselves: the art of legislation ... teaches how a multitude of men, 
composing a community, may be disposed to pursue that course which upon the 
whole is most conducive to the happiness of the whole community, by means of 
motives to be applied by the legislator." 
Id. (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, The Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. xix,§ 1, in 1 THE 
WoRKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (John Bowring ed., 1962)). We are not certain we agree with 
Lomasky's interpretation of the passage (to us, Bentham is making the distinction between the 
personal and the political, but to the extent he is endorsing "private ethics" that instruct the 
pursuit of personal, rather than collective, ends, it is at least conceivable that he is doing so 
because he thinks that such personal conduct will, all things considered, maximize total happi-
ness). While ultimately arguing that the interpretation Lomasky attributes to Bentham is cor-
rect, David Lyons has argued that there are strong reasons in favor of both interpretations. "If 
we take [Bentham] to assume that interests naturally converge, then we can understand how he 
could say in effect that a man who serves his own happiness will always serve the happiness of 
his fellow-creatures, and vice versa." DAVID LYONS, IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNED 54-55 
(1991). The philosophical point, however, that Lomasky and Lyons are making holds; one might, 
for various reasons, adopt a maximand but constrain the domain over which it operates. 
17 JoHN RAwLS, The Basic Structure as Subject, in PoLmCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 14, 
at 265-67, 287 ("[T]he constraints that Locke imposes on the as-if historical process are not 
strong enough to characterize a conception of background justice acceptable to free and equal 
moral persons."). For an alternative view, see A. JoHN SIMMONS, THE LocKEAN THEORY OF 
RIGHTS 288-98 (1994) (offering a conception of moderate Lockean liberalism that he takes to be 
most consistent with persons conceived of as free and equal). 
18 RAWLS, supra note 17, at 266. For Rawls, social justice is a matter of a complete set of 
social rules, the general adherence to which best promotes the demands of the two principles of 
justice. This account is arguably liable to what David Lyons has called the charge of "extensional 
equivalence." DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 63, 161-77 (1965). While 
the question of whether a set of rules can be justified by a particular maximand is an interesting 
one, and certainly one to which Rawlsianism needs to answer, it is beyond the scope of this 
Article. We are explicating the Rawlsian view of contracts rather than defending Rawlsianism 
per se. 
19 RAWLS, supra note 17, at 266-67. 
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some measure, in terms of whether or not certain conditions exist in the 
background to individual (or local) transactions. The necessity of back-
ground conditions to social justice20 creates a demand for a basic structure 
that establishes these conditions. 
An additional explanation (or purported justification) for the focus on 
the basic structure is Rawls's claim that even when "fair background condi-
tions ... exist at one time [they may] be gradually undermined" by individu-
als engaging in individual transactions even when their actions strictly follow 
"local" rules of private transa1.tions.21 Rawls argues that the "invisible hand" 
tends to work in the wrong direction, "away from" justice and so as to 
"erode[]" just background conditions.22 This judgment turns on Rawls's 
view that rules for private transactions cannot (or should not) speak to social 
justice-such rules (alone) will not be sufficient to ensure and maintain back-
ground justice. This is because rules for "individual transactions cannot be 
too complex, or require too much information to be correctly applied; nor 
should they enjoin individuals to engage in bargaining with many widely scat-
tered third parties, since this would impose excessive transaction costs."23 
For Rawls, then, full-blown social justice requires a set of institutions (i.e., the 
basic structure) governing background conditions.24 The basic structure, 
then, functions to ensure background justice; the rules for private transac-
tions are to answer to "simplicity and practicality."25 
Now that there is an explanation of why Rawls introduces the concept of 
the basic structure, we turn to our second question: which institutions consti-
tute the basic structure? Rawls's writing on this subject is ambiguous.26 In 
some places, it appears that Rawls holds that all social institutions that affect 
one's life prospects are understood as constitutive of the basic structure-this 
view is sometimes understood as the "broad" view.27 At other times, indeed 
20 See, e.g., id. at 267 ("Thus whether wage agreements are fair rests, for example, on the 
nature of the labor market: excess market power must be prevented and fair bargaining power 
should obtain between employers and employees. But in addition, fairness depends on underly-
ing social conditions, such as fair opportunity .... "). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 268-69. 
25 Id. at 268. 
26 See THOMAS W. PoaaE, REALIZING RAWLS 21 (1989) ("Rawls leaves this notion [of the 
basic structure) not merely vague but also ambiguous."); id. at 23 ("This notion of basic struc-
ture, an elaboration of the account in A Theory of Justice, conflicts with a narrower understand-
ing of the term which dominates Rawls's discussion in 'The Basic Structure as Subject."'); Hugo 
Adam Bedau, Social Justice and Social Institutions, in 3 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY: 
STUDIES IN ETHICAL THEORY, 159, 169 (Peter A. French et al. eds., 1978) ("[T]he whole concept 
of basic institutions in Rawls's theory is vaguer than one might expect, given the role he insists 
they are supposed to play in any adequate theory of social justice."). 
27 Here, a question arises as to which aspects of social life (if any), given the broad concep-
tion, lie outside the basic structure. The answer to this question is, however, not uncontroversial. 
See, e.g., G.A. Cohen, Where the Action ls: On the Site of Distributive Justice, 26 PHIL. & Pus. 
AFF. 3, 4 (1997) ("[T]he view that I oppose is the Rawlsian one that principles of justice apply 
only to what Rawls calls the 'basic structure' of society."). Some commentators question the 
relevance of making a distinction between a basic structure and other aspects of social life. See, 
e.g., Liam Murphy, Institutions and the Demands of Justice, 27 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 251, 251 (1999) 
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even in his explanation of the focus on the basic structure discussed above, 
Rawls writes in a manner suggesting that the basic structure is less expansive 
and is exclusive of the private law and private ordering-the so-called "nar-
row" view.28 From Rawls's writing, then, it is an open question what" exactly 
constitutes the basic structure of society and which institutions are to be eval-
uated in terms of their provision of primary goods. 
In the broader conception associated chiefly with A Theory of Justice, 
the basic structure is constituted by the distribution of "fundamental rights 
and duties," the allocation of the benefits and burdens of "social coopera-
tion," the "political constitution and the principal economic and social ar-
rangements," the "legal protection of freedom of thought and liberty of 
conscience," "competitive markets, private property in the means of produc-
tion, and the ... family."29 In this view, it appears that any aspects of social 
life that affect one's life prospects constitute the basic structure.30 
In The Basic Structure as Subject, on the other hand, Rawls defends the 
narrow conception.31 He maintains that there is 
a division of labor between two kinds of social rules, and the differ-
ent institutional forms in which these rules are realized. The basic 
structure comprises first the institutions that define the social back-
ground and includes as well those operations that continually adjust 
and compensate for the inevitable tendencies away from back-
ground fairness, for example . . . income and inheritance taxation 
designed to even out the ownership of property.32 
He elaborates, "What we look for, in effect, is an institutional division of 
labor between the basic structure and the rules applying directly to individu-
als and associations and to be followed by them in particular transactions. "33 
In this narrow view (call the previous sentence "A"), Rawls holds that con-
tracts and private ordering are outside the scope of the two principles of 
justice.34 
("I defend the contrary view: all fundamental normative principles that apply to the design of 
institutions apply also to the conduct of people."). 
28 See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
29 RAwLS, supra note 7, at 7. 
30 Id. ("Taken together as one scheme, the major institutions define men's rights and du-
ties and influence their life-prospects, what they can expect to be and how well they can hope to 
do. The basic structure is the primary subject of justice because its effects are so profound and 
present from the start."); see id. at 178 ("The principles of justice apply to the basic structure of 
the social system and to the determination of life prospects." (discussing criticisms of 
utilitarianism)). 
31 See RAwLS, supra note 17. 
32 Id. at 268. 
33 Id. at 268-69. He further writes, "If this division of labor can be established, individuals 
and associations are then left free to advance their ends more effectively within the framework 
of the basic structure, secure in the knowledge that elsewhere in the social system the necessary 
corrections to preserve background justice are being made." Id. at 269. 
34 This is somewhat controversial. In the previous paragraph, Rawls writes in a manner 
that might conceivably be construed as supportive of a broad conception. 
This structure also enforces through the legal system another set of rules which 
govern the transactions and agreements between individuals and associations (the 
law of contract, and so on). The rules relating to fraud and duress, and the like, 
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It is an open question, as a matter of Rawls exegesis, which view of the 
basic structure Rawls himself held. Independent of what Rawls himself actu-
ally thought, the philosophical puzzle comes to this: (1) which institutions 
constitute the basic structure; and (2) exactly why are these institutions-as 
opposed to other political and legal institutions, social practices, or private 
actions-the subject of justice and thus constitutive of the basic structure. In 
other words, it is an open question which conception of the basic structure 
would be justifiably held by a thoroughgoing Rawlsian and what the ramifica-
tions of this conception are for contract law. 
Several possible candidates have been introduced as philosophically de-
fensible conceptions of the basic structure. The first candidate is the narrow 
view that we discussed above. To be clear, in the narrow conception, the 
basic structure is limited to a scheme of constitutional liberties plus the sys-
tem of tax and transfer. That is, the domain of the second principle of justice 
is limited to the system of tax and transfer. 
The second candidate, the "coercive conception," holds that all coercive 
political and legal institutions are constitutive of the basic structure.35 In this 
view the social ethos of society, for example, is outside the scope of the basic 
structure. Rawls himself, however, seems to deny the truth of the coercive 
conception and instead defends a narrower conception, one seemingly lim-
ited to tax and transfer, in The Basic Structure as Subject.36 
A third candidate is what we have called above the broad view-namely, 
the view that all aspects of social living that affect citizens' life prospects con-
stitute the basic structure. This view has been defended by G.A. Cohen, who 
argues that this is the proper conception of the basic structure, although he 
belong to these rules, and satisfy the requirements of simplicity and practicality. 
They are framed to leave individuals and associations free to act effectively in pur-
suit of their ends without excessive constraints. 
Id. at 268 (emphasis added). The answer to the interpretive question turns on exactly what 
Rawls means here by "this structure"-if he means the basic structure, then this passage might 
be taken to suggest support for the broad view. See Murphy, supra note 27, at 261 & n.30. We, 
however, maintain that this interpretation is not possible in light of sentence "A" above. Mur-
phy, in essence, appears to treat sentence "A" as a mistake. Id. at 261 ("All this suggests that 
Rawls did not after all intend the account of the basic structure offered in 'The Basic Structure as 
Subject' to differ significantly from that offered in A Theory of Justice."). Note as well that The 
Basic Structure as Subject is not the only Rawlsian text in which Rawls defends the narrow view. 
See JOHN RAwLS, A Kantian Conception of Equality, in COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 11, at 
262 ("[T]he difference principle holds, for example, for income and property taxation, for fiscal 
and economic policy; it does not apply to particular transactions or distributions, nor, in general, 
to small scale and local decisions, but rather to the background against which these take place."). 
For an interpretation of the "division of labor" as invoking the narrow conception, see Ripstein, 
supra note 1, at 1813. 
35 This conception is attributed to Rawls by G.A. Cohen. Cohen, supra note 27, at 19 
("The basic structure, in this ... understanding of it, is, so one might say, the broad coercive 
outline of society, which determines in a relatively fixed and general way what people may do 
and must do .... "). Cohen, of course, also recognizes that, as a textual matter, Rawls is ambigu-
ous regarding the basic structure, so this is just one of the possible interpretations of the Rawl-
sian texts. See id. 
36 See RAwLS, supra note 17, at 268-69 (stressing the "institutional division of labor be-
tween the basic structure and the rules applying directly to individuals and associations and to be 
followed by them in particular transactions"). 
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concludes that this conception "shipwrecks" the Rawlsian project.37 Thomas 
Pogge, on the other hand, attributes something akin to this view to the Rawls 
of A Theory of Justice. 38 We defend this broad view as the proper Rawlsian 
conception and maintain that it does not "shipwreck" the Rawlsian project. 
We argue that this view is consistent with what we take to be the Rawlsian 
conception of contracts. 
We argue that despite the ambiguity in the Rawlsian text and the confu-
sion that this ambiguity has engendered in the philosophical literature, there 
is in Rawlsian political philosophy a coherent view of the bounds of the basic 
structure of society. We further argue that despite Rawls's remarks to the 
contrary, the broad view of the basic structure must be correct: the two prin-
ciples of justice properly apply to all social institutions that affect one's life 
prospects. 
It follows from this that contrary to the conventional view of Rawlsian-
ism,39 contract law should be properly understood as subject to the principles 
of justice. If this is correct, Rawlsianism is not, as it is often thought to be, 
indifferent with regard to the nature of contract law. Interestingly, while we 
do hold that Rawls's writing is ambiguous in this regard, we maintain that our 
understanding of Rawlsianism is not entirely revisionist-we will argue that 
there are passages in Rawls's writing that our (arguably) controversial view 
helps to clarify. 
II. Contract Law and the Basic Structure 
As we saw above in the Introduction, in the narrow conception of the 
basic structure, contract law is outside the scope of the two principles of jus-
tice, and Rawlsianism is, therefore, neutral with regard to it. In this view of 
the basic structure, the domain of the principles of justice is limited to 
(roughly) institutions of tax and transfer (in addition to the basic constitu-
tional liberties).40 In the narrow view, contract law is a private matter, not 
37 Cohen, supra note 27, at 11 ("[If] the Rawlsian basic structure includes ... conventions 
and usages that are deeply entrenched but not legally or literally coercive ... it shipwrecks ... 
the whole approach to justice that Rawls has taught so many to pursue."). 
38 PoGGE, supra note 26, at 23. 
39 RAwLS, supra note 7, at 8 ("[The principles of justice] may be irrelevant for the various 
informal conventions and customs of everyday life; they may not elucidate the justice, or perhaps 
better, the fairness of voluntary cooperative arrangements or procedures for making contractual 
agreements."); Kronman, supra note 4, at 500 ("Rawls's preference for taxation ... and his 
reluctance to view the private law of contracts as an equally appropriate vehicle for redistrib-
uting wealth reflect an attitude shared by many liberal thinkers. Is it possible to justify this 
preference for taxation and the non-distributive conception of contract law that it entails?" ( cita-
tion omitted)); Joseph Mendola, On Raw/s's Basic Structure: Forms of Justification and the Sub-
ject Matter of Social Philosophy, 71 MONIST 437, 439 (1988) ("Rawls does not hold that the first 
subject of social evaluation should be all institutions or practices. That would be, he thinks, too 
broad a concern. He wants us, rather, to focus first on a few institutions that are important in a 
specific [way]. For instance, he rules out of the basic structure ... 'procedures for making con-
tractual agreements."' (citation omitted)); Ripstein, supra note 1, at 1813 (arguing that tort law, 
like contract law, lies outside the basic structure). 
40 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SocIAL JusTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 195 (1980) 
("Rawls ... restrict[s] his principles of justice to something called the 'basic structure,' specifi-
cally exempting all issues involving the fairness of particular transactions."); DAVID LYONS, ETH-
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subject to the principles of justice, which do "not apply to particular transac-
tions or distributions, nor, in general, to small scale and local decisions."41 
For the proponent of the narrow conception of the basic structure, then, 
the very question as to what is the Rawlsian conception of contract law is ill-
formed. Indeed, from such a perspective, the question itself embodies a the-
oretical confusion over the domain of the two principles of justice because, in 
this view, contract law is outside the basic structure. 
Our purpose is to argue that the narrow conception of the basic struc-
ture is mistaken and to explain our understanding of the basic structure and 
the place of contract law in Rawlsian political theory.42 In our view, the con-
fusion over the basic structure is attributable to an instructive misunderstand-
ing concerning what a Rawlsian should think about the domain of the 
principles of justice and their relationship to the private law. If the narrow 
conception is incorrect, there are two possible alternatives: contract law 
might lie partly inside and partly outside the basic structure, or contract law 
might lie entirely inside the basic structure (call these the "medium" and 
"broad" conceptions, respectively).43 
III. Contract Law and the First Principle of Justice 
If contract law is within the basic structure (in whole or in part), it is 
governed by the two principles of justice. The first principle of justice con-
1cs AND THE RuLE OF LAW 131-32 (1984) ("Rawls defines benefits in terms of 'primary goods'-
socially distributable goods, such as income and wealth, liberty and opportunity . . . . This fits 
nicely with Rawls's concentration on the basic structure of society. The principles of justice are 
meant to regulate the effects of basic institutions and do not apply to private arrangements and 
transactions."); PoooE, supra note 26, at 23 (contrasting a "narrow" with a "wider" view of the 
basic structure and stating that, with respect to the economic aspects of the narrow view, "(t]he 
basic structure of a developed society might then include little more than its welfare and school 
systems"); RAWLS, supra note 17, at 262-63 ("[The difference principle] applies in the first in-
stance to the main public principles and policies that regulate social and economic inequalities. 
It is used to adjust the system of entitlements and rewards, and the standards and precepts that 
this system employs. Thus the difference principle holds, for example, for income and property 
taxation, for fiscal and economic policy; it does not apply to particular transactions or distribu-
tions, nor, in general, to small scale and local decisions, but rather to the background against 
which these take place . . . . What is enjoined is that the inequalities make a functional contribu-
tion to those least favored."); see also Thomas W. Pogge, On the Site of Distributive Justice: 
Reflections on Cohen and Murphy, 29 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 137, 138 (2000) ("[A)ccording to 
[Rawls's difference principle) a society's basic structure, its tax regime in particular, should be 
shaped to achieve [compliance with the difference principle)."). Kronman cites Rawls as an 
example of a liberal "who oppose[s] the use of contract law as a redistributive device ... be-
cause ... distributional objectives ... are always better achieved through the tax system than 
through the detailed regulation of individual transactions." Kronman, supra note 4, at 474 & 
n.11. 
41 RAWLS, supra note 17, at 262. 
42 While we draw upon the Rawlsian texts, our project is ultimately normative as opposed 
to interpretive (i.e., an exegesis of John Rawls's thinking). We attempt to demonstrate what a 
plausible Rawlsian political theorist ought to think in this regard given her theoretical 
commitments. 
43 See Murphy, supra note 27, at 258 ("[On the narrow view] the institution of contract 
law, which does impinge on people's daily lives insofar as it rules out force and fraud in contrac-
tual relations, does not count as part of the basic structure, whereas on the broader characteriza-
tion offered in A Theory of Justice it would seem to."). 
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structs and distributes what might be understood as, roughly, constitutional 
liberties.44 The basic liberties Rawls mentions to be distributed by the first 
principle include: 
political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office) 
together with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience 
and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along with the right 
to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and 
seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law.45 
It is tempting to conclude that the first principle, given its focus on lib-
erty, must guarantee the right to contract. The "High" Rawlsian position, 
however, is that, strictly speaking, all economic constructions-tax and trans-
fer, property rules (i.e., the details of ownership, including rights of transfer 
and use, acquisition and bequest, etc.), antitrust, minimum wage, offer and 
acceptance, unconscionability, and the other doctrinal rules of contract law-
are properly understood as second principle matters. To invoke these mat-
ters at the level of the first principle would be implicitly to invoke economic 
conceptions and distributive notions that are simply nonexistent at the first 
principle stage. Given, for example, that the details of the right to contract 
are a function of property rules that must be constructed as a second princi-
ple matter, it is clear that the first principle of justice cannot construct the 
specific details of contract law. 
Rawls himself, however, is less than fanatical about how strictly the di-
vide between basic liberties and economic matters must be observed. He 
allows, for example, the right to personal property to be constructed by the 
first principle, but he is also clear that the details of this abstract right are to 
be constructed by the second principle.46 Our modest claim is that, by anal-
ogy, the first principle may require the construction of at least some con-
tracting options as open-the details of which (of course) must be created by 
the second principle in its construction of the complete economic scheme.47 
To be clear, all of contract doctrine and the details of the post-institu-
tional right to contract are to be understood as second principle matters.48 
44 RAwLS, supra note 7, at 302 ("Each person is to have an equal right to the most exten-
sive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all."). 
45 Id. at 61; see also RAWLS, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in PoLmCAL LIBER-
ALISM, supra note 14, at 291 (listing basic liberties constructed by first principle of justice). 
46 RAWLS, supra note 45, at 298 ("[A)mong the basic liberties of the person is the right to 
hold and to have the exclusive use of personal property. The role of this liberty is to allow a 
sufficient material basis for a sense of personal independence and self-respect . . . . [W)ider 
conceptions ... of property are decided at later stages .... "). 
47 Rawls himself, to be clear, appears to stop short of including transfer rights in his con-
ception of personal property as a first principle matter. Id. ("Two wider conceptions of the right 
of property as a basic liberty are to be avoided. One conception extends this right to include 
certain rights of acquisition and bequest."). Our point, however, is that there does not appear to 
be any principled difference between the independence and self-re.spect fostered by at least 
some use and exclusion rights with regard to personal property and those fostered by at least . 
some transfer rights. The latter might be constructed to include some contract options. 
48 On this matter, we are in apparent disagreement with Nathan Oman. See Nathan 
Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 M1cH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript 
at 27, on file with authors) (noting that for the Rawlsian, "limitations on contractual freedom, 
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The first principle, in our view, may operate in this regard at only the most 
abstract level-imposing upon the second principle (in its economic construc-
tion) an abstract requirement that (at least) some contracting options be con-
structed as open. To commit ourselves to anything stronger, for example, 
something patterning the Friedian notion of a pre-institutional right to con-
tract, at the level of the first principle would be to invoke what Murphy and 
Nagel have called the "myth of ownership"49 and would be mistaken. Analo-
gously, it would be mistaken to conclude that when Rawls introduces the 
notion of personal property he has committed himself to any particular, ro-
bust conception of private property or system of ownership (Lockean or 
otherwise). 
If we are correct, the first principle might guarantee that the state would 
stand ready to enforce at least some aspects of private promises or bargains. 
No particular set of free contracting options (including remedies), however, 
would be guaranteed to be constructed. Indeed, Rawls is explicit in his view 
that the first principle of justice does not guarantee that all contracting op-
tions be open. He writes that a "[l]ibert[y] not on the list [guaranteed by the 
first principle], for example, the right to ... freedom of contract as under-
stood in the doctrine of laissez-faire [is] not basic: [it is] not protected by the 
priority of the first principle."50 
Rawls takes seriously the possibility that society can be organized in any 
number of different institutional forms. Some such forms might include a 
system of contract law, while others might not.51 In any case, as we have said, 
an unconstrained freedom to contract is not guaranteed by the first principle. 
For example, an institutional scheme might feature bargaining and promising, 
such as those represented by the doctrines of consideration, capacity, and unconscionability need 
to be justified in terms of preserving equal liberty"). 
49 LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 
98-99 (2002). 
so RAWLS, supra note 11, at 239. While a laissez-faire conception of the freedom to con-
tract is typically understood as a pre-institutional matter, Rawls is best understood as pointing 
out that any post-institutional right to contract constructed by the liberty principle would not 
feature a commitment to leaving all options open in a manner that would pattern itself after the 
(pre-institutional) laissez-faire approach. H.L.A. Hart has remarked that basic or fundamental 
liberties guaranteed by the first principle need not pattern pre-institutional notions of liberty. 
"[The liberty principle] refers not to 'liberty' but to basic or fundamental liberties which are 
understood to be legally recognized and protected from interference." H.L.A. Hart, Rawls on 
Liberty and Its Priority, in READING RAWLS 230, 235 (Norman Daniels ed., 1975). Rawls himself 
appears to accept Hart's remark: "Hart noted, however, that in Theory I sometimes used argu-
ments and phrases which suggest that the priority of liberty as such is meant; although as he saw, 
this is not the correct interpretation." RAWLS, supra note 45, at 292; see Samuel Freeman, Illib-
eral Libertarians: Why Libertarianism ls Not a Liberal View, 30 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 105, 112-15 
(2002) (discussing role of private property and contract in various forms of liberalism). 
51 Rawls is not always clear as to which legal institutions will or will not be required by the 
two principles of justice, nor does he always provide the argument as to why. See Bedau, supra 
note 26, at 170 ("But all [Rawls] really says is that these institutions suffice; he explicitly denies 
he gives any argument that they are necessary, and suggests that perhaps they are not. Such 
caution is praiseworthy, but it is troubling not to be told whether, for example ... [various legal 
and political institutions are] necessary to implement the principles of justice in a constitutional 
democracy. It is difficult to believe that none of these institutions is necessary, and it is also 
difficult to believe that there is no argument that shows they are necessary." (citations omitted)). 
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but lack state enforcement of promises.52 For Rawls, at least, it seems that 
this possibility is open.53 
The preceding quotation from Rawls, however, can be misleading. 
While it is clear that the first principle of justice does not enjoin an uncon-
strained right to freedom of contract (i.e., a right to have all contracting op-
tions open), it does not follow that the first principle of justice should not 
guarantee that some contracting options be constructed as "free."54 If, for 
example, it were true that state enforcement of promises (i.e., contract law) 
were to provide (in at least some cases) a net increase in liberty, then the 
right to have at least some contracting options open would be generated by 
the first principle of justice. Constructing some contracting options as open 
would not seem seriously to encroach upon other important competing lib-
erty interests (e.g., freedom of thought and conscience, and freedom of the 
person).55 
52 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 1 (1981) (defining "contract" as a prom-
ise enforced by the state). 
53 RAwLS, supra note 7, at 345-46 ("I shall not regard promising as a practice which is just 
by definition, since this obscures the distinction between the rule of promising and the obligation 
derived from the principle of fairness. There are many variations of promising just as there are 
of the law of contract. Whether the particular practice as it is understood by a person, or group 
of persons, is just remains to be determined by the principles of justice."). 
54 Samuel Freeman also raises the question of the status of the right to private property 
and freedom of contract in liberal political philosophy. He writes: 
[L]iberals do not respect the outcome of just any given private agreement as a valid 
enforceable contract. This is related to the omission of rights of property and free-
dom of contract from the lists of liberal basic rights and liberties . . . . Some may 
see this omission as glaring. Locke, after all, is said to have argued for a 'natural 
right of property' . . . . [H]is argument seems to place rights of property on a par 
with basic rights. But whatever Locke intended by his account of property in the 
state of nature, neither he nor any other major liberal philosopher argue that gov-
ernments have no authority to regulate property and contractual agreements, and 
burden them when necessary for the public good. 
Freeman, supra note 50, at 113-14 (citations omitted). Similarly, Thomas Nagel writes: 
[I]t isn't clear what is to be included in 'liberty.' If it includes unrestricted eco-
nomic liberty, the result would be extreme economic laissez-faire; but that is not 
what Rawls has in mind. The equal liberties he thinks justice requires are personal 
and civil liberties and basic political rights; they do not include unrestricted free-
dom of contract and disposition of property or freedom from taxation for redistrib-
utive purposes. 
THOMAS NAGEL, The Writings of John Rawls, in CONCEALMENT AND EXPOSURE AND OTHER 
EssAYS 79 (2002). The point is that demonstrating that rights of property and contract are not 
absolute is not sufficient to show that some aspects of such rights are not basic (i.e., constructed 
by the first principle). Rawls argues that basic liberties can be traded off against one another. 
See infra note 55. Therefore the obviously true claim that the right of contract is not absolute is 
not sufficient to show that some aspects of it cannot be guaranteed by the first principle of 
justice. In a later essay, Thomas Nagel acknowledges this point. See Thomas Nagel, Rawls and 
Liberalism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 62, 68 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003) 
("This rejection of economic freedom as a value in itself is one feature of Rawls's view that has 
attracted opposition ... [if] this should be allowed to have some effect on the form of a just 
economic system [t]hat might be expressed by some modification in the interpretation of Rawls's 
first principle, to admit a measure of economic freedom as a protected right."). 
55 RAWLS, supra note 11, at 239 ("[Liberties protected by the first principle] have a central 
range of application within which they can be limited and adjusted only because they clash with 
other basic liberties. None of these liberties, therefore, is absolute, since they may conflict with 
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To further elaborate, some aspects of contract law might provide an in-
creased freedom to rely on promissory transactions. This reliance could be 
an aspect of maximizing the liberty content of the package of equal basic 
liberties required by the first principle of justice. Of course, there are other 
mechanisms that can promote such beneficial reliance. These include, for 
example, reputation (through reciprocal interactions or ethnic ties) and hos-
tage giving.56 To the extent, however, that these other mechanisms offer only 
incomplete57 and sometimes illiberal solutions that would need to be traded 
off against other liberties, contract law seemingly allows for beneficial reli-
ance, and therefore some (open) contracting options may conceivably be re-
quired by the first principle of justice. In a complex liberal society in which 
citizens have different life plans, goals, and values, it seems particularly likely 
that noncontractual mechanisms will fail to best allow for beneficial reliance. 
This matter is, however, even more complicated than it initially appears. 
The first principle of justice, in Rawls's view, is a maximizing principle, taking 
lexical priority over the second principle. The question of exactly how 
strictly the requirements of maximizing and lexical priority are to be under-
stood, even in the context of Rawls's "special conception,"58 has been the 
subject of substantial discussion.59 The issue comes to this: if one takes seri-
ously (1) the maximizing component of the Equal Maximal Liberty Principle; 
(2) the claim that the first principle is not to address or guarantee economic 
freedom or minimal welfare rights; and (3) the requirement of adherence to 
the lexical priority of the first principle over the second, it is possible that 
such a vast sum of society's resources will be consumed in meeting the lib-
erty-maximizing demand of the first principle of justice that few resources 
will remain available for meeting the economic demands of the second.60 
This problem has led commentators to argue that either the first princi-
ple needs to be interpreted so as to require that minimal economic needs be 
met,61 or that the first principle should not be conceived of as an uncon-
one another; but, however they are adjusted to form one's system, this system is to be the same 
for all."). 
56 See, e.g., David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 373 (1990); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. EcoN. & 
0RG. 5 (1985); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Ex-
change, 73 AM. EcoN. REV. 519 (1983). 
57 See, e.g., Charny, supra note 56, at 408-09 (discussing situations in which parties prefer 
legal enforcement of contracts). 
58 RAWLS, supra note 7, at 151-52, 542. 
59 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 50, at 252 ("Rawls' argument for the priority of liberty pur-
ports to rest on interests ... and to demonstrate that the general priority of liberty reflects a 
preference for liberty over other goods which every self-interested person who is rational would 
have .... I do not think that [his argument] succeeds in demonstrating [liberty's] priority."); 
PoGGE, supra note 26, at 123-34. 
60 PoGGE, supra note 26, at 147 n.45 ("[O]ne needs, though Rawls does not provide, the 
notion of a sufficiently secure or well-protected basic right or liberty. Failing this, the first princi-
ple could, realistically, never be satisfied and would then require all available social resources to 
be devoted to such things as expansion of police forces (to improve protection of the basic right 
to physical integrity)."). 
61 This entails the piercing of the strict lexical priority between the first and second princi-
ples of justice in the sense that the first principle now includes some economic concerns that 
were previously purely a second principle matter. However, note that the first principle, so 
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strained maximizing principle. As an example of the first proposed solution, 
Thomas Pogge has suggested that the first principle should be interpreted to 
require some guarantee of basic economic needs, even at the cost of some 
tradeoffs in liberty.62 The second proposed solution transforms the max-
imization component of the first principle into a sufficiency principle.63 
The Rawlsian solution to this dilemma seems to be that the maximizing 
component of the first principle of justice be jettisoned. This is the position 
Rawls adopts in The Basic Liberties and Their Priority.64 If the first principle 
merely requires the provision of adequate liberty, then presumably the sec-
ond principle of justice continues to play a crucial role with respect to eco-
nomic matters. 
Once the notion of the first principle of justice as a maximizing principle 
has been abandoned, it no longer seems as likely that, simply because benefi-
cial reliance may be liberty-enhancing, aspects of contract law are required by 
the first principle of justice. Indeed, the very reasons for abandoning the 
strictly maximizing version of the first principle are to ensure that: (1) soci-
ety's resources will not be exhausted by the first principle; and (2) the eco-
nomic scheme will not be entirely structured by the demands of the first 
principle of justice. Without the maximization criterion, some liberty-en-
hancing moves (e.g., large increases in expenditures on policing with only 
insignificant gains in personal security) might not be made. Therefore, as-
pects of contract law might not be required even if they were liberty-
enhancing. 
There is, however, an aspect of contract law that would seem to distin-
guish it from liberty-enhancing moves that come at some economic cost, such 
as the policing expenditures in the previous example. The adoption of some 
aspects of contract law might be efficiency enhancing. Therefore, if it both 
increased liberty and decreased (on net) the cost of "liberty packages," it is 
difficult to see why it would not be included as part of an adequate equal 
liberty package selected by a nonmaximizing first principle of justice. There 
would certainly be no guarantee (or requirement), however, that it would be 
so included. So, the case that some aspects of contract law be required as a 
first principle matter remains murky once the first principle is modified so as 
not to be maximizing. Nonetheless, with regard to Rawls's remark quoted 
interpreted, continues to maintain lexical priority over the second principle (which would govern 
economic matters that are not a matter of providing for basic economic needs). 
62 PoGGE, supra note 26, at 142-47. 
63 See id. at 147 n.45. A third potential solution might be to subject the maximization 
component of the first principle to a cost ceiling. 
64 RAwLS, supra note 45, at 332 ("[I]t is tempting to think that the desired criterion should 
enable us to specify ... the basic liberties in the ... optimum[] way. And this suggests in tum 
that there is something that the scheme of basic liberties is to maximize. Otherwise, how could 
the best scheme be identified? But in fact, it is implicit in the preceding account ... that the 
scheme of basic liberties is not drawn up so as to maximize anything .... Rather, these liberties 
and their priority are to guarantee equally for all citizens the social conditions essential for the 
adequate development and the full and informed exercise of [their moral] powers .... " (empha-
sis added)). Nonetheless, in this later essay, Rawls does continue to maintain that the difference 
principle remains a maximizing one. Id. at 326 ("The basic structure of society is arranged so 
that it maximizes the primary goods available to the least advantaged .... " (emphasis added)). 
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above concerning the first principle of justice,65 it still does not follow that 
because not all contracting options are guaranteed to be open the first princi-
ple does not require some aspects of contract law.66 
IV. Conceptions of Contract Law and the Difference Principle 
We turn now to the question of whether the second principle of justice 
might provide a guarantee that at least some contracting options are con-
structed as open. For present purposes, we are concerned with the demands 
of the difference principle.67 The difference principle demands that society's 
economic scheme be arranged to ensure that inequalities are to the advan-
tage of the least well-off. It is, however, an open question exactly how the 
demands of the difference principle are best met. The narrow conception of 
the basic structure holds that the best way to meet the demands of the differ-
ence principle is through a system of taxation and transfer. Importantly, 
given Rawls's post-institutional conception of property, taxation is not a mat-
ter of redistribution, as it is typically understood in our public lexicon, but 
rather a matter of distribution.68 For Rawlsians, post-tax incomes represent 
distributive shares that are justified by the overarching distributive scheme 
(the difference principle). Market outcomes have no independent normative 
significance and are an irrelevant baseline for the purposes of economic dis-
tribution in a Rawlsian scheme.69 
One might object to the narrow conception by questioning its reliance 
on taxation and transfer to satisfy the demands of the difference principle. It 
is not clear to us that a Rawlsian must hold that the demands of the differ-
ence principle are best met entirely through a system of taxation and transfer. 
Assume for the sake of argument, as Rawls sometimes does,70 that the politi-
65 See supra text accompanying note 50. 
66 Of course, as we argued above, the details of contract law would be constructed in 
service to the demands of the second principle of justice. 
67 We discuss the equal opportunity component of the second principle of justice below in 
Part VIII. 
68 See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 49, at 32-33 (discussing what they term "everyday 
libertarianism," a view embodying a confusion over the distinction between distribution and re-
distribution). They write: 
Id. 
There is no market without government and no government without taxes; and 
what type of market there is depends on laws and policy decisions that govern-
ments must make. In the absence of a legal system supported by taxes, there 
couldn't be money, banks, corporations, stock exchanges, patents, or a modern 
market economy-none of the institutions that make possible the existence of al-
most all contemporary forms of income and wealth. It is therefore logically impos-
sible that people should have any kind of entitlement to all their pretax income. 
All they can be entitled to is what they would be left with after taxes under a 
legitimate system, supported by legitimate taxation-and this shows that we cannot 
evaluate the legitimacy of taxes by reference to pretax income. 
69 RAwLS, supra note 7, at 311-13 ("(A] just scheme gives each person his due: that is, it 
allots to each what he is entitled to as defined by the scheme itself."). This point is not exclusive 
to Rawls but is true for any political theory featuring a post-institutional conception of property. 
See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 49, at 36; Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Tax and 
the Philosopher's Stone, 89 VA. L. REv. 647, 649-52 (2003). 
70 E.g., RAWLS, supra note 7, at 275-81. 
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cal institutions adopted to meet the demands of the difference principle will 
include a market economy and a system of private Jaw. Assume further that 
the latter includes contract and tort law. It then is not clear why contract and 
tort Jaw cannot be leveraged to help in meeting the demands of the differ-
ence principle. Political and legal institutions have complex and dynamic ef-
fects on one another. It thus seems unlikely that an e~onomic scheme that 
maximizes the position of the least well-off would rely exclusively on tax and 
transfer for distribution. For example, the manner in which the rules of tort 
law function may have dramatic effects on the position of the least ad-
vantaged.71 To the extent that tort law is one of the means through which 
accidents are deterred and accident victims are compensated, it seems that it 
(in addition to tax) could be harnessed to meet the demands of the difference 
principle. 
Consider our claim that nontax legal and political institutions may prop-
erly be understood as the subject of distributive justice in the context of the 
contemporary debate over conceptions of contract law. Central to this de-
bate is the question of the role (if any) distributive justice plays in one's con-
ception of contract Jaw. Consider again two (possibly) conflicting 
conceptions of contract law:72 an ex post approach that gives priority to and 
has at its foundation the value of autonomy,73 and an ex ante approach that 
gives priority to a specified distributive end.74 There are two obvious candi-
dates for an ex ante approach: Kronman's conception of contract as distribu-
tive justice,75 or the wealth-maximization approach.76 Kronman defends a 
conception of contract Jaw in which contract law embodies (or is suffused 
with) a conception of distributive justice. For Kronman, legitimate contracts 
embody a standard of justice exogenous to the will of the contracting par-
ties.77 Contrast this view with a "will" theory of contracts that maintains that 
autonomy is central to contract law.78 In this view, the conception of legiti-
macy or fairness in contracting is endogenous to the will of the contracting 
parties; questions of distributive justice (i.e., exogenous standards of justice) 
71 Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, On Belling the Cat: Rawls and Corrective 
Justice 12-13 (Jan. 13, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
72 See, e.g., Peter Benson, Contract, in A CoMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 24, 43 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996); Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 687 (Jules Coleman & Scott 
Shapiro eds., 2002) (discussing distinction between deontic and consequential theories of 
contract). 
73 See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 2, at 13-14; A. JOHN SIMMONS, ON THE EDGE OF ANARCHY: 
LocKE, CONSENT, AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIETY 72 (1993) (discussing social contract theory and 
political obligation); Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, in PERSPEC-
TIVES ON CONTRACT LAW 70 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 2d ed. 2001). 
74 Here, it is important to understand that for Rawls the conception of contract law that is 
adopted is inevitably ex ante, in the sense that, if it exists, it serves the demands of the two 
principles of justice. The question of what form such contract rules will take, however, is open. 
75 See Kronman, supra note 4, at 472-73. 
76 See, e.g., PosNER, supra note 3, at 94-96; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing 
Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1265-67 (1980); Lewis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (2001). 
77 See Kronman, supra note 4, at 474. 
78 See FRIED, supra note 2, at 16. 
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are not addressed at the level of contract law. Our aim is not to weigh in on 
this debate, but rather to show that Kronman's conception of contracts is a 
viable approach for a Rawlsian, and that therefore the narrow conception of 
the basic structure is mistaken.79 
Interestingly, Kronman can be plausibly interpreted as distinguishing his 
view from that of Rawls. Kronman appears to maintain that he, unlike 
Rawls, holds that contracts are necessarily understood as a locus of distribu-
tive justice. He seems to attribute to Rawls the narrow conception of the 
basic structure and to view this as inconsistent with his own (Kronman's) 
conception of contract law. In this vein, Kronman suggests that Rawls would 
not view contracts as a proper locus of redistribution. He cites Rawls as an 
example of a liberal "who oppose[s] the use of contract law as a redistributive 
device ... because ... distributional objectives ... are always better achieved 
through the tax system than through the detailed regulation of individual 
transactions. "80 
While we agree with Kronman that Rawls has made statements consis-
tent with the narrow view, we are less certain that Rawls should have 
adopted (or that a Rawlsian should adopt) this conception of the basic struc-
ture. The difference principle demands that we select, in comparison with 
alternative economic schemes, that scheme which maximizes the position of 
the least well-off. Consider a scheme in which at least some contract rules 
(e.g., unconscionability) are designed to achieve desirable distributive effects. 
In this scheme, some contracting options-those deemed unconscionable-
are closed. If, as it may be sound to think is the case,81 the position of the 
least well-off is higher in this scheme than in a scheme where distribution is 
accomplished solely through taxation and transfer, the Rawlsian would select 
the former scheme. There does not seem to be any principled reason for 
rejecting, a priori, the use of some contract rules for distributive ends. 
Furthermore, in keeping with there being no principled reason for a 
Rawlsian to prefer the exclusive use of tax and transfer for the achievement 
of distributional aims, it seems difficult to distinguish between "taxation" and 
"other legal rules." In the Rawlsian political scheme, the very objects of tax-
ation (e.g., property and income) are themselves post-institutionally created 
and defined by legal rules, among them the rules of taxation. The conven-
tional distinctions between property law, contract law, and taxation, that 
seem natural and intuitive in political theories with a pre-institutional con-
ception of property, are blurred for a Rawlsian. For example, a Rawlsian 
might plausibly view the required remittance of fifty percent of one's wages 
to the government as constituting "taxation" at a fifty-percent rate, but could 
also plausibly characterize that remittance as instantiating a "property" rule 
79 See Murphy, supra note 27, at 260 (discussing relationship between Kronman's view and 
the basic structure, and concluding "whether taxation and transfer, on the one hand, or contract 
law, on the other, can better achieve the aim of securing justice while leaving people as free as 
possible to pursue their own interests unhindered by the machinery of justice is in large part an 
empirical question, subject to changing circumstances"). 
80 Kronman, supra note 4, at 474 & n.11. 
81 See Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A 
More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797, 798 (2000). 
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(i.e., both I and the government own fifty percent of my "wage"). Any claim, 
then, that distribution is best achieved via taxation and transfer might, for the 
Rawlsian, be either trivially true (if "taxation" is defined, post-institutionally, 
as any mechanism of distribution) or trivially false (e.g., rules implementing 
distribution are defined as "property" law). Therefore, maintaining a princi-
pled distinction between tax and nontax legal rules seems difficult (and, per-
haps, unmotivated) for a Rawlsian. 
To the extent that one insists that such a distinction is nonetheless plausi-
ble, one might argue that as an empirical matter the principles of justice are 
best satisfied exclusively through a system of tax and transfer.82 Importantly, 
the truth of such an empirical claim presupposes the truth of the broad view 
of the basic structure, because legal rules other than those of tax and transfer 
must be considered in making such an empirical judgment. The mere posing 
of the empirical question of whether distribution is best done solely via tax 
and transfer, or also via the construction of some non-tax-and-transfer legal 
rules, itself presupposes that non-tax-and-transfer legal rules are subject to 
the principles of justice. 
Even if non-tax-and-transfer legal rules are (on empirical grounds) con-
structed to be maximally efficient, leaving all efficiency-equity tradeoffs to 
the system of tax and transfer, it still follows that contract law is subject to the 
two principles of justice. The efficient design of contract law (in this hypo-
thetical example) is in service to the principles of justice. Since legal rules 
(even when constructed so as to maximize economic efficiency) are to serve 
as distributive devices, the narrow view of the basic structure is false. 
There is, however, reason to be dubious of the hypothetical claim that as 
an empirical matter the demands of the principles of justice are best met 
exclusively via a system of tax and transfer and that, therefore, contract law 
would not feature any equity-oriented commitm~nts (i.e., all efficiency-equity 
tradeoffs would be made via the system of tax and transfer). Recall that for 
Rawls the two principles of justice distribute primary goods, not merely liber-
ties on the one hand and wealth and income on the other.83 These primary 
goods include, importantly, the "social bases of self-respect."84 Thus, even if 
a difference principle conceived of as distributing merely income were best 
satisfied only through the use of taxation and transfer, it does not follow that 
the distribution of primary goods (subject to the difference principle) is best 
satisfied in the same manner.85 For example, suppose that the incomes of the 
least well-off are somewhat lower, but their level of self-respect is higher 
(such that overall they receive more in terms of the objective index of the 
primary goods) under a scheme in which they suffer fewer (albeit compen-
sated) injuries or in which they receive more leisure than they might other-
wise contract over if, for example, all wealth-maximizing contract options 
82 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994). 
83 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 59 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) ("The 
two principles of justice assess the basic structure according to how it regulates citizens' shares of 
primary goods, these shares being specified in terms of an appropriate index."). 
84 Id. at 58-59; see also RAwLS, supra note 7, at 179. 
85 We are grateful to John G. Bennett for helping us to clarify this matter. 
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were constructed as open. The difference principle would, therefore, reject 
the wealth-maximization conception. In other words, it does not follow that 
because tax and transfer might be the preferred instruments of distribution 
given the aim of wealth maximization, they would so remain with the aim of 
maximizing the position of the least well-off in terms of the index of the pri-
mary goods.86 If this is correct, Rawls cannot properly be viewed as a wealth-
maximization theorist with regard to the private law. The rules of the private 
law should contain at least some efficiency-equity tradeoffs. 
If we are correct that some contract rules could have advantageous dis-
tributive effects, then the Rawlsian (arguably) arrives at what we have 
termed the medium conception of the basic structure-at least some contract 
rules are drawn into the basic structure, where they serve the end of distribu-
tive justice. The rest of contract rules remain outside the basic structure. 
A more thorough analysis of what exactly this would mean, however, 
demonstrates the implausibility of the medium conception. In order for 
some portion of the total scheme of contract rules to have been moved within 
the basic structure, all the rules of the scheme must have been evaluated as 
candidates. In the medium conception, only those rules that are most instru-
mental to the demands of justice are subsumed under the basic structure; the 
rest are left external to it. But that account fails to recognize that the com-
patibility of every rule within the scheme is assessed against the demands of 
the difference principle. Even if the scheme of contract rules constructs the 
vast majority of contracting options as open (or free), it would not follow that 
only part of the scheme is in the basic structure. The portion of the scheme 
that is constructed as free is not outside the basic structure but is constructed 
as open in service to the difference principle.87 All the rules of contract law 
are thus subject to the difference principle, even those that construct options 
as open. In other words, even if a contract doctrine, from the internal per-
spective, appears free, from the external perspective that doctrine is serving 
the demands of the difference principle. Freedom (or from the internal per-
spective, anything that might appear to be outside the basic structure) has 
been constructed instrumentally, in service to the difference principle. All of 
contract law resides within tbe basic structure, so now the only remaining 
possible conceptions are either what we termed in Part I the coercive concep-
tion, or the broad view. The medium conception is incoherent. 
The coercive conception can be rejected for reasons similar to those for 
which we reject the medium conception. In essence, the coercive conception 
is question begging. It asserts that only the coercive political and legal insti-
86 In other words, while if viewed in isolation there might be little economic difference 
between, for example, direct transfer payments (via welfare or earned income tax credits) and 
indirect arrangements that less transparently advantage the least well-off, the mechanism via 
which money is delivered can affect self-respect. 
87 This is analogous to a point Bedau has made in discussing Rawls's purported neutrality 
between socialist and capitalist societies. In our case, the "freedom" to contract is instrumental 
to the difference principle (even if indirectly so), as the "residual issues" are in Bedau's analysis. 
Bedau, supra note 26, at 170 ("Rawls can think of his principles of justice as neutral between 
socialist and capitalist economies only with respect to residual issues; he has already turned over 
to government major functions of what could otherwise be in the private sphere." (emphasis 
added)). 
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tutions of society are in the basic structure; the rest of society (e.g., "social 
ethos") is outside. Crucially, however, this conception fails to indicate which 
institutions are to be coercive, i.e., it lacks the resources to adjudicate the 
important question of which aspects of social arrangements (e.g., dating?) are 
to be coerced by the state. We maintain that all social arrangements are con-
sidered as possible subjects of political and legal policy. Some matters might 
be constructed to be free from state-sanctioned coercion-but this is because 
either the first principle of justice requires freedom as a matter of liberty, or 
because the difference principle finds that, all things considered, the demands 
of justice are best achieved by constructing those matters as free. But be-
cause such matters are free in service to the two principles of justice, they are 
inside the basic structure-within the range of the two principles of justice. 
The coercive conception is thus false and the broad view is correct.88 
In light of this conclusion, recall from Part I Rawls's explanation of the 
basic structure as necessary to ensure background justice; he maintained that 
the rules pertaining to individual (or local) transactions are not (alone) suffi-
cient to ensure and maintain background justice. Granting him, for the sake 
of argument, the latter point, we can now see that this does not demonstrate 
that contract law must be outside the basic structure. It simply shows that the 
rules of contract law (that should, in our view, be understood as constitutive 
of the basic structure) are not sufficient to provide full justice. But there is no 
reason to conclude from the fact that justice requires, for example, a system 
of tax and transfer that contracts are to be understood as outside the basic 
structure. So, Rawls's reason for focusing on the basic structure (i.e., the 
need for background justice) does not preclude contract law from being sub-
ject to the principles of justice. Indeed, quite the contrary: background jus-
tice may, in fact, require that contract law be deployed instrumentally in 
meeting the demands of the two principles of justice. Rawls's argument con-
cerning background conditions, then, simply shows that a Lockean view is 
not sufficient to achieving what is, for the Rawlsian, full justice. It does not 
show that anything in particular is outside the basic structure. Indeed, from 
88 Liam Murphy has in passing argued against the conventional narrow conception and in 
favor of a broad conception of the basic structure that would include contracts. Murphy, supra 
note 27, at 261 ("[I]t is indeed hard to see how legal rules applying directly to people could be 
regarded as entirely outside the purview of justice, so that, for example, sales taxes, or principles 
of unconscionability in contracts, could in principle not be evaluated on grounds relating to 
distributive justice."). We are in agreement with Murphy's theoretical claim concerning the rela-
tionship between the basic structure and contracts. We disagree with him, however, that Rawls 
in The Basic Structure as Subject need be interpreted as advocating the broad view. See supra 
note 34. While Murphy's argument does laudably maintain that contracts are within the basic 
structure, he treats as a mistake Rawls's remarks that the "rules that govern the transactions .. . 
between individuals ... (the law of contract, and so on) ... are framed to leave individuals .. . 
free to act effectively in pursuit of their ends and without excessive constraints," RAwLS, supra 
note 17, at 268 (emphasis added); see Murphy, supra note 27, at 261. Our argument suggests 
that, if Rawls in The Basic Structure as Subject is to be read, as Murphy advocates, as supporting 
the broad view (despite our claim to the contrary), one need not treat Rawls's remarks as mis-
taken. Our conception of Rawlsian freedom of contract (as referring to the set of contracting 
options constructed as open in service to the principles of justice) provides an explanation of 
what Rawls might have meant by "free," assuming that Murphy is correct that Rawls was de-
fending the broad view in The Basic Structure as Subject. 
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this argument, nothing follows concerning what is to be left outside the basic 
structure. Of course, in our view, it is incoherent for any institution to be 
outside the basic structure-even matters that appear to be free have been 
constructed as options open or free. 
V. Inside the Basic Structure 
Now that we have shown that the broad conception of the basic struc-
ture is correct, it is necessary to explore exactly what this means. It is, as we 
will see, an easy mistake to assume that this means that those legal or politi-
cal institutions (such as contract law) that lie within the basic structure must 
therefore pattern or appear to be "read off of' the principles of justice. We 
will explain, with reference to several examples, the nature of post-institu-
tional freedom and what it means to be subject to the principles of justice yet 
at the same time free of their direct governance in particular transactions or 
activities. 
We begin by explaining how our view differs from that of G.A. Cohen. 
Recall from Part I that Cohen holds: (1) social ethos is inside the basic struc-
ture; and (2) this "shipwrecks" the Rawlsian project, because "[t]he basic 
structure, the primary subject of justice, is always said by Rawls to be a set of 
institutions, and, so he infers, the principles of justice do not judge the actions 
of people within Gust) institutions whose rules they observe."89 This state-
ment, however, appears to conflict with our notion of the role of freedom in 
the Rawlsian framework. True, some options will be constructed as free, such 
that people have a choice as to whether to exercise those options, but such 
options are constructed as free in service to the two principles of justice. Thus, 
if, for example, social ethos is free, it may well be free in service to the first 
principle of justice (i.e., as required by freedom of thought and conscience). 
If this is so, then social ethos is inside the basic structure (Cohen is correct on 
this point), but people are free, to use one of Cohen's examples,90 to djssent 
from a "Protestant ethic" even if such an ethos were to be instrumental to 
improving the position of the least well-off. Thus, for us, even though social 
ethos is subject to the principles of justice, that does not imply that the ethos 
must reflect the difference principle.91 This is due to the lexical priority of 
the liberty principle and the fact that ethos may well be constructed as free by 
that principle. The Rawlsian project, on our reading, is therefore not ship-
wrecked by the illiberal inevitability of its requiring that social ethos be read 
directly off of the difference principle. 
Next, consider Rawls's statement with regard to the difference principle 
and private ordering. He writes that the difference principle 
applies in the first instance to the main public principles and policies 
that regulate social and economic inequalities. It is used to adjust 
the system of entitlements and rewards .... Thus ... [it] holds, for 
example, for income and property taxation, for fiscal and economic 
policy; it does not apply to particular transactions or distributions, 
89 Cohen, supra note 27, at 18. 
90 Id. at 14. 
91 See id. at 22. 
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nor, in general, to small scale and local decisions, but rather to the 
background against which these take place.92 
621 
In our view, the Rawlsian text is confused when it says that the difference 
principle "does not apply to particular transactions." 
While it is true that individual, small scale, or local transactions may be 
free, that is to say, operating within options constructed as open, it is con-
fused to say that the principles of justice do not "apply" to these legally per-
missible moves. It is, after all, the principles of justice that constructed the 
options open-instrumentally-that is to say, for a particular purpose. The 
freedom surrounding local and small scale transactions is post-institutional 
freedom (i.e., legally permissible options constructed as open) in service to 
the principles of justice. Of course, it does not follow from this point that the 
substance of local and small-scale transactions is to be directly read off of the 
principles of justice. To be clear, individual contracts must conform to the 
rules of contract law, which are in tum designed (in conjunction with all 
other rules and policies) in a manner maximally instrumental to the princi-
ples of justice. 
While the substance of individual contracts is not directly read off of the 
principles of justice, it is incoherent to think that such contracts are not sub-
ject to the principles of justice. Their legal permissibility is a function of the 
two principles of justice.93 To draw upon an analogy from the rules of chess, 
it is incoherent to think that the rules of chess do not "apply" to the permissi-
ble diagonal moves of a bishop, simply because those rules (when taken in 
their totality) in some instances (e.g., when one's own piece does not block 
the way) allow the bishop to move diagonally freely. Of course, this freedom 
is constructed subject to the rules of chess. 
Enough with games. The crucial point is that the rules of contract law 
are not directly "read off of' the difference principle. Only the complete 
scheme of all legal and political institutions is directly answerable to the dif-
ference principle. Therefore, Rawls is in our view incorrect to draw a distinc-
tion between contract and tax law. Tax policy is to be designed in a manner 
subservient (or instrumental) to the demands of the difference principle, but 
it (too) is not directly answerable to the difference principle. Instead, both 
tax law and contract law are selected as part of an overall scheme that maxi-
92 RAwLS, supra note 34, at 262. 
93 This would also hold true for the relationship between the two principles of justice and 
the "family." Intrafamilial interactions need not directly pattern the two principles of justice, 
but the rules of family law are to be constructed in service to them (though the rules need not 
pattern them). That is to say, the (micro)interactions of each and every family are not read 
directly off of the two principles of justice, but the principles of justice do govern the rules or 
laws that constitute the institution of the "family." It is in this sense that family law, too, is in the 
basic structure, even if aspects of it are constructed as free or open. Contrast this with Robert 
Nozick's view that the principles of justice simply cannot apply to the family. ROBERT NozicK, 
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 167 (1974) ("Should a family devote its resources to maximizing 
the position of its least well off and least talented child, holding back the other children or using 
resources for their education and development only if they will follow a policy through their 
lifetimes of maximizing the position of their least fortunate sibling? . . . [W]hat I think would be 
Rawls' reply [is] that some principles apply at the macro level which do not apply to micro-
situations."). 
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mizes the position of the least well-off. Thus, the difference principle applies 
in the same sense to both tax and contract-only the overall scheme of all 
legal and political institutions is selected in keeping with the two principles of 
justice. 
If we are correct, all of contract law lies within the basic structure, and 
the Rawlsian must arrange contract law, in conjunction with the overall 
scheme, in a manner that is instrumental to serving the demands of the prin-
ciples of justice. Even if a particular scheme maximizes the position of the 
least well-off entirely through mechanisms of tax snd transfer, it does not 
follow that contract law is outside the basic structure. Contract law would 
still be within the basic structure, because contract rules would have been 
evaluated and constructed as open (in service to the difference principle). 
For Rawlsian theory, then, contract law is both governed by and suffused 
with distributive aims. If we are correct, Rawls is not silent over conceptions 
of contract law. Contract law is within the basic structure (even when, by 
design, contracting options are constructed as open). 
Take, for example, Rawls's distinction between "domestic" and "local" 
justice. He says that the former applies to the basic structure and the latter 
to "associations." He states that domestic justice "constrain[ s] (or limit[ s ]), 
but do[ es] not determine uniquely, the suitable principles of local justice."94 
"[Q]uestions of local justice ... call[] for separate consideration on their 
merits."95 In our view, this is somewhat misleading, but we can offer an in-
terpretation that maintains, to some degree, the distinction Rawls is attempt-
ing to draw. "Local justice" could, in our view, be seen as the outcome of 
choices made within options open. Thus interpreted, Rawls's comment about 
domestic justice constraining but not determining local justice makes sense. 
On the other hand, his comment that local justice is "separate" is misleading, 
as, in our view, options were constructed open in service to the principles of 
justice. Nonetheless, from the internal perspective, the citizen in a Rawlsian 
scheme might find Rawls's comment more intuitive, inasmuch as it is cer-
tainly true that the many possible decisions and arrangements private citizens 
make within the confines of what we call "options open" need not pattern, 
nor appear to be read off of, the principles of justice. 
We are now in a position to show where Rawls fits in the contemporary 
debate over competing conceptions of contract law. If there is to be an insti-
tution of contract law, Rawls would adopt the view that contract is a matter 
of distributive justice. This conception is consistent with Kronman's claim 
that contract law is the subject of distributive justice.96 For Rawls, the free-
dom to contract is simply the question of which contracting options are con-
structed as open and which are closed in service to the two principles of 
justice-which serve as the exogenous standard(s) of distributive justice. 
Interestingly, Rawls's view of contract law as distributive justice would 
also be quite distinct from that of Kronman.97 Kronman defends a version of 
94 RAWLS, supra note 83, at 11-12. 
95 Id. at 11. 
96 Kronman, supra note 4, at 474. 
97 Larry Alexander and William Wang have argued that Kronman should have embraced 
the Rawlsian maximand, the difference principle, for the purposes of assessing legitimacy in 
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Paretianism as the exogenous standard of distributive justice governing con-
tract law.98 For Rawls, contract law would be constructed such that, when 
viewed in conjunction with all other legal and political institutions, it best 
serves the demands of the principles of justice. For Rawls, the two principles 
of justice define distributive shares that are just, so the introduction of an 
independent standard of distributive justice for the assessment of contract 
(e.g., the Pareto Principle) is incoherent. This is not to say, however, that an 
independent standard of justice in contracting cannot potentially be used; the 
point is that such a standard would have no normative significance indepen-
dent of the two principles of justice. Such a standard of distributive justice 
would be entirely instrumental in serving (along with all other aspects of the 
scheme) the demands of the two principles of justice. 
In addition, our understanding of contract law may be of assistance in 
explaining Rawls 's shift from a broad to a narrow conception of the basic 
structure. In The Basic Structure as Subject, Rawls seems anxious to point 
out that, consistent with the difference principle, "individuals and associa-
tions are then left free to advance their ends."99 This seems to have led him 
to assert that contract law is outside the basic structure and to suggest that 
distribution is best done via tax and transfer. Our point is that although con-
tract law resides within the basic structure, this does not imply that all or 
most contracting options will be closed because they are subject to the de-
mands of the two principles of justice. It may well be that the economic 
scheme that best maximizes the position of the least well-off will construct 
many contracting options as open. Individuals are thus free to pursue their 
ends, within the bounds of the contracting options that remain open, without 
additional interference by the two principles of justice.100 Thus, if Rawls was 
principally concerned in The Basic Structure as Subject with rebutting Robert 
Nozick and demonstrating that his project was compatible with a certain level 
of individual freedom in private transactions, he need not have narrowed his 
conception of the basic structure. For a Rawlsian, the freedom to contract 
exists as a function of the demands of the two principles of justice. 
VJ. The Objection from Democracy 
Our claim is that contract law for the Rawlsian is properly understood as 
being subject to the two principles of justice and that Rawlsianism is, there-
fore, not neutral with regard to conceptions of contract law. One might, 
contract. Larry Alexander & William Wang, Natural Advantages and Contractual Justice, 3 L. & 
PHIL. 281, 284 (1984) ("[T]here is a third version of paretianism that it is fair to claim Kronman 
actually holds. That version requires that all rules reflecting pre-contractual assignments of 
wealth, as well as all rules governing contractual relations-indeed, all rules affecting the distri-
bution of wealth generally-be tailored to maximize the wealth of those with the least wealth."). 
98 Kronman, supra note 4, at 486. 
99 RAWLS, supra note 17, at 269. 
100 Contracts that are allowed (i.e., contracts over options constructed as open) are in com-
pliance with the demands of the difference principle, i.e., the private allocation of resources by 
contracting parties is not (again) "reviewed" by the difference principle. Id. at 283 ("[T]he 
[Nozickian-though Rawls avoids naming him] objection that the difference principle enjoins 
continuous corrections of particular distributions and capricious interference with private trans-
actions is based on a misunderstanding."); see Noz1cK, supra note 93, at 167. 
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however, object that our conclusion, while in some sense true, is also mislead-
ing. Such an objection holds that even if contract law is for Rawlsian political 
theory a matter of distributive justice, the rules of contract law still cannot (in 
any interesting sense) be subject to the difference principle. In this view, it is 
the legislature, not the principles of justice, that determines contract law (as 
well as all difference principle matters). That is to say, contract rules are not 
simply the set of rules that Gointly with the other rules in the full scheme of 
legal and political institutions) maximizes the position of the least well-off. 
Contract rules are to be determined by a democratically elected legislature. 
The first principle of justice requires that (nonconstitutional) political 
institutions be designed by a democratically elected legislature.101 For Rawls 
such nonconstitutional institutions include the scheme of tax and transfer, as 
well as rules of contract law and other private law matters (if there is to be a 
private law). Rawls (himself) is explicit that second principle matters are not 
among the constitutional essentials.102 Given that (1) the first principle of 
justice takes lexical priority over the second; and supposing (2) it is the differ-
ence principle (not the liberty principle) that demands contract law, the ob-
jection holds that it is misleading for us to conclude that the rules of contract 
law are governed by the difference principle. Therefore, our conclusion that 
contract law is (for the Rawlsian) a matter of distributive justice is mislead-
ing, if by this we mean that contract law (in conjunction with all other legal 
and political institutions) is under the control of the difference principle. In 
this view, second principle (including difference principle) matters are to be 
adjudicated by the democratically elected legislature-the legislation it en-
acts is by definition just and this is a matter of pure procedural justice. So, the 
objection concludes, we are in some sense mistaken-matters of contract are 
not (as we suggest) answerable to any maximand. 
There are a number of responses to this objection. First, the first princi-
ple of justice may well demand that some contract options be left open; if this 
is true, it does not follow that the democratic process takes lexical priority 
over all contracting options. On the other hand, our central argument does 
suggest that the difference principle (in addition to the first principle) may 
require that some contract options be constructed as open. If this is correct, 
then the objection that the democratically elected legislature is to rule on 
contract law holds, so our claim that contract law (in conjunction with the 
entire scheme of legal and political institutions) must answer to the second 
principle of justice is arguably misleading. 
To be clear, the objection holds that institutions over which the second 
principle governs are to be selected by the democratically elected legislature, 
so whatever conception of contract law the legislature constructs is just by 
definition. This, again, is taken to be a matter of pure procedural justice-
101 RAwLS, supra note 45, at 339 ("[T]he constitution specifies a just political procedure and 
incorporates restrictions which both protect the basic liberties and secure their priority. The rest 
is left to the legislative stage."). 
102 Id. at 337 ("Although delegates have a notion of just and effective legislation, the sec-
ond principle of justice, which is part of the content of this notion, is not incorporated into the 
constitution itself."). 
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even when the legislature fails to create law that maximizes the position of 
the least well-off, it succeeds in making just law. 
A second and perhaps stronger response is to address the matter head-
on. One might suggest that Rawls was mistaken to exclude the second princi-
ple of justice from the constitution and that a Rawlsian should incorporate 
both principles of justice in the constitution.103 If this is correct, the legisla-
tors would be explicitly duty bound to implement the scheme of contract 
rules (if there is to be contract law) that best serves the two principles of 
justice. If the second principle of justice is conceived of as a constitutional 
matter, presumably the legislators' failure to implement the second principle 
of justice would be corrected by judicial review.104 
A third response is that simply because contract law possesses the pedi-
gree of having been enacted by a democratically elected legislature, it does 
not follow that the legislature has made no mistake when it enacts legislation 
that does not meet the demands of the difference principle (i.e., maximizing 
the position of the least well-off). While it may be true that such a law of 
contract should (in Rawlsian terms) be viewed as just law, it would also be 
coherent to state that the legislature has failed in its duty to maximize the 
position of the least well-off. 105 On this account, the democratically elected 
legislature is not free to vote however it sees fit-its members are to enact 
· political policies that satisfy the demands of the second principle of justice.106 
Of course, the legislature may fail in its duty, and this failure may be either 
culpable or nonculpable (given the constraints of knowledge). When it fails, 
it has made a mistake (blamable or not) even if this mistake is ultimately to 
constitute just law .101 
In this view, the legislature is duty bound to create political and legal 
institutions that maximize the position of the least well-off. There is no rea-
son to believe that contract law is excluded from the range of legal mecha-
nisms for doing so, which means that contract law is inside the basic 
103 We analyze Rawls's explanation and purported justification for excluding second princi-
ple matters from constitutional essentials in Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Rawls, 
Judicial Review and the Second Principle of Justice (Mar. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with authors). 
104 See PoooE, supra note 26, at 158 & n.65 (describing Rawls's failure to incorporate the 
second principle of justice into the constitution as a "remarkable fiat" and stating that "I see no 
reason why the basic political liberties should have to be understood as including the liberty to 
pass legislation that violates the second principle"). Pogge maintains that "the equal basic politi-
cal liberties ... are consistent with a system of judicial review that would filter out at least the 
clearer cases of legislation violating the second principle." Id. 
105 RAwLS, supra note 45, at 338 ("[A]ll legal rights and liberties other than the basic liber-
ties as protected by the various constitutional provisions (including the guarantee of the fair 
value of the political liberties) are to be specified at the legislative stage in the light of the two 
principles of justice." (emphasis added)). 
106 See RAwLS, supra note 83, at 48 (discussing "the legislative stage in which laws are 
enacted as the constitution allows and as the principles of justice require and permit" (emphasis 
added)). 
107 For a discussion that addresses the obligation of individual citizens to obey just law and 
questions the sense in which such law applies to individuals and why they are bound to particular 
just institutions, see A. JOHN SIMMONS, MoRAL PRINCIPLES AND PoLmcAL OsuoATIONS 
147-52 (1979); see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 193 (1986). 
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structure. Therefore, contract law is to be constructed in keeping with the 
principles of justice in exactly the same way that all second principle matters 
(e.g., taxation) are to be constructed. There is no contract law exceptional-
ism, contra what Rawls himself often appears to indicate. 108 
This third response, however, is subject to the criticism that it abandons 
the Rawlsian project's attempt to deliver a theory of pure procedural justice. 
Instead, it treats the legislative stage as a matter of imperfect procedural jus-
tice-that is, it invokes a standard (the second principle of justice) exogenous 
to the procedures being followed to criticize the outcome produced by the 
procedures. This problem, however, arises for all second principle matters; 
(again) our claim is simply that there is no contract law exceptionalism. In 
other words, to the extent that the failure to constitutionalize the second 
principle of justice is problematic and not solved by one of our three sug-
gested solutions, the problem is one for Rawlsianism simpliciter, not a prob-
lem unique to the role of contract law in Rawlsianism. 
If it is correct that Rawlsians are unwilling to abandon their commitment 
to creating a true theory of pure procedural justice,109 it seems that Rawls's 
opposition to constitutionalizing the second principle of justice should be re-
jected, lest the difference principle be rendered impotent. 
VII. Application: Unconscionability 
We will illustrate the role of contract in Rawlsian political philosophy 
using the doctrine of unconscionability. Because, in our view, Rawlsian con-
tract law is to be governed by the two principles of justice, fairness in con-
tracting is defined in terms of a conception of distributive justice that is 
exogenous to the will of the contracting parties. That is, for contracts to be 
viewed as fair they must, in some fashion, answer (or conform) to the de-
mands of the two principles of justice. This is, as we have seen, by no means 
to say that the maximand of the difference principle is to be applied directly 
to each and every individual contract. Instead, the two principles of justice 
select a set of rules that, when applied generally, is instrumental to the over-
all scheme of legal and political institutions that maximizes the position of 
the least well-off, as compared to other possible schemes. For the Rawlsian, 
then, the function of unconscionability, should it be selected as one of the set 
of contract rules, would be to close contracting options110 in a manner that is 
in service to the two principles of justice. The economic scheme that maxi-
mizes the position of the least well-off, then, may include a scheme of con-
tract law that itself contains a rule resembling what is conventionally 
understood as unconscionability. Unconscionability, as we argue below, pro-
vides an instructive illustration of the contrast between the distributive jus-
108 See, e.g., RAwLS, supra note 7, at 8. 
109 Cf PoaaE, supra note 26, at 151 n.53 (discussing how his approach differs from that of 
Rawls). 
uo Such as the option of a furniture company to extend credit with an enforceable cross-
collateral clause to Mrs. Williams. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.Zd 445 
(D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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tice approach to contract law, which invokes an exogenous standard, and the 
ex post or autonomy conception. 
Unconscionability is, of course, not without opponents. Proponents of 
the autonomy conception of contracts view the doctrine with skepticism be-
cause of its perceived paternalistic character and have also found the doctrine 
to be (in part) incoherent.111 If contract law is understood as part of the basic 
structure, however, a nonpaternalistic (indeed, distributive) justification for a 
coherent conception of the doctrine is available (should that doctrine be 
selected). 
We illustrate the role that unconscionability might play in a Rawlsian set 
of contract rules in the context of Seana Shiffrin's recent and important work 
on unconscionability. Shiffrin proposes what she maintains is a coherent and 
nonpaternalistic account of the doctrine of "pure substantive unconscionabil-
ity. "112 She argues that her account of the doctrine is consistent with the 
theory of contract law most antithetical to substantive unconscionability: the 
"will" theory of contracts. Shiffrin assumes for the sake of argument that the 
will theory is true.113 As we explain below, we are not certain that Shiffrin's 
conception of unconscionability is consistent with the will theory, nor that · 
her view, given her acceptance of the will theory, is properly understood as 
nonpaternalist. Nonetheless, we do think that portions of Shiffrin's concep-
tion of unconscionability are consistent with what we take to be the Rawlsian 
account of contract law. 
Our understanding of Shiffrin's view is this: the state has obligated itself 
to enforce all fully consensual contracts, but this obligation is not absolute. 
There are times when the state's obligation to enforce (even) fully consensual 
contracts can be overridden.114 Shiffrin proposes that if the· state deems a 
contract to be manifestly unfair, that provides a reason for overriding the 
obligation of enforcement.115 In this view, the state is being called upon to 
facilitate a manifestly "unfair" arrangement, but because the state's obliga-
tion of enforcement is not absolute, the state has the discretion to abstain 
from enforcement in such cases. 
To be clear, Shiffrin's claim is not that the state ought to refuse to en-
force some fully consensual contracts out of direct concern for the "ex-
ploited" party, which she maintains would be paternalistic, but rather that the 
state's refusal "to enforce an unconscionable contract could reflect an unwill-
ingness to lend its support and its force to assist an exploitative contract be-
111 E.g., FRIED, supra note 2, at 104-05 (labeling the notion of substantive unfairness in 
unconscionabi!ity "two parts sentiment and one part common sense"). 
112 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 
29 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 205, 209 (2000), ("[T]hat is, the doctrine that independent of whether there 
are procedural defects in the contract's formation that taint a transaction's voluntariness, a con-
tract's terms may themselves be so oppressive or unfair that they warrant a court's refusal to 
enforce them."), reprinted in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 508, 509 (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 
7th ed., 2004). 
113 Id. ("Moreover, to share as much ground as possible with critics of the unconscionabil-
ity doctrine, I will also suppose that a 'will' theory of promising, of or like the kind advocated by 
Charles Fried, is true."). 
114 Id. at 227-28. 
115 Id. at 205, 227-28. 
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cause it is an unworthy endeavor to support. In such a case, the refusal to 
enforce unconscionable contracts would not be paternalist."116 
We are, however, uncertain of Shiffrin's conclusion that the will theorist 
would accept the unconscionability doctrine as grounds for vitiating "ex-
ploitative" agreements. We will explain our uncertainty. For will theorists, 
fully voluntary contractual arrangements that embody the will of the con-
senting parties are thought to be autonomy-preserving and therefore fair by 
definition. Typically, this requires the absence of procedural defects such as 
fraud or duress and of immoral or illegal terms (typically reflecting a concern 
with third-party effects-e.g., contract killing). For the will theorist, if such 
defects or terms are present, contractual arrangements fail to represent the 
legitimate will of the parties. Such arrangements do not preserve the parties' 
autonomy and are, by definition, "unfair." These arrangements are thought 
to be illegitimate from the start and, therefore, should not be enforced. 
Legitimate117 contracts, in contrast, are those that lack procedural de-
fects and do not embody immorality or illegality. Such contracts embody the 
will of the parties and are therefore understood as fair by definition. Shiffrin, 
however, understands terms that are "seriously one-sided, ... exploitative, or 
otherwise manifestly unfair"118 to constitute grounds for justifying the state's 
refusal to enforce an agreement because of the "unfairness" contemplated by 
such terms. Shiffrin is correct that the obligation to enforce (even legitimate) 
contracts is not absolute, but, given her acceptance of the will theory, concep-
tions of fairness external to the will of the parties are incoherent and there-
fore not possible candidates for outweighing the state's obligation to enforce. 
Such claims of unfairness require an exogenous conception of distributive 
justice, which is not available.119 
For the will theorist, a contract that is otherwise legitimate (i.e., lacking 
in procedural defects or immoral or illegal terms) but that contains one-sided 
terms is, by definition, fair. Therefore, "inequities" cannot ground a claim of 
unconscionability owing to unfairness. Claims of unfairness must instead be 
addressed to the conception of fairness itself-the will theory.120 It is, of 
course, possible that one might argue, under the objective theory of contract, 
that inequities are evidence of procedural unconscionability. The will theo-
rist, however, would view such evidence as only being more or less useful to 
116 Id. at 227-28 (citation omitted). 
117 We use "legitimate" to denote voluntary arrangements that are autonomy-preserving 
and involve no procedural defects. In this model, legitimacy is to contracts as validity is to truth. 
On the other hand, "justification" is understood as a matter of "all things considered" right 
action. While Shiffrin does not adopt this language, it seems that doing so might have made her 
view a bit more clear. See A. John Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, 109 ETHICS 739, 741 
n.5 (1999). 
118 Shiffrin, supra note 112, at 205. 
119 See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 163 (rev. ed. 1990) 
("In [Fried's) view, because contract is based on and enforces promises, courts are not entitled to 
use a dispute that arises in contract either to promote an independent ideal of justice by refusing 
to enforce bad or hard deals, or to further the economic or other aims of society as a whole.''). 
120 See id. at 166 ("The libertarian view, then, squares with Fried's analysis of contract as 
promise and ... deeply conflicts with the position that contract law promotes the aims of distrib-
utive justice.''); Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 69, at 664. 
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the central inquiry into the existence of consent.121 Shiffrin, however, ap-
pears both to understand such arrangements as unfair and to view this judg-
ment as nonpaternalistic. We disagree; the judgment that the arrangement is 
"unfair" fails to take seriously (in paternalistic fashion) that the will of the 
consenting parties is definitive of fairness. 
In contrast, consider what we take to be the Rawlsian view of contract 
law. In this view, fairness is not defined in terms of the will of consenting 
parties, but rather by an external standard of distributive justice. If (even 
fully consensual) contractual arrangements depart from a contract rule of 
substantive unconscionability adopted because it instrumentally serves the 
two principles of justice, then that rule may be invoked on fairness grounds 
that would not involve paternalism. For example, judges might be duty 
bound to abstain from enforcing seriously lopsided (or "exploitative") con-
tracts because, all things considered, doing so would be to the advantage of 
the least well-off. Such a doctrine might appear paternalistic to contracting 
parties, but, crucially, there is an available nonpaternalist justification for the 
doctrine that is rooted, ultimately, in the two principles of justice-which 
define the conception of fairness. 122 
VIII. Contract Law and the Opportunity Principle 
We have not yet commented on the role of the opportunity principle (a 
component of Rawls's second principle of justice and taken to be lexically 
prior to the difference principle ).123 Here, the central question for our pur-
poses is whether the opportunity principle opens and closes contracting op-
tions, assuming that contract law is understood as a component of the basic 
structure. Rawls, discussing the opportunity principle, states that it entails 
not merely that "careers [be] open to talents" but also "that all should have a 
fair chance to attain them."124 As an example of the latter, he states that the 
government must assure that those with similar "native endowments" of tal-
ent (presumably this means "potential talent") be afforded similar opportuni-
ties to develop those talents.125 "[T]hose who are at the same level of talent 
and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, shouid have the same 
prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social 
system .... "126 
The precise meaning of the opportunity principle is not well filled-in in 
the Rawlsian texts, 127 and several conceptions are at least plausible.128 We 
121 Of course, the will theorist has no theoretical commitment to the objective view of con-
tracts. FRIED, supra note 2, at 61 ("[T]he so-called objective standard of interpretation ... 
palpably involves imposing an external standard on the parties."). 
122 See Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 MONIST 64, 65 (1972) (discussing "paternalistic" 
looking rules with available nonpaternalistic justifications). 
123 RAwLS, supra note 7, at 302-03 ("Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so 
that they are ... attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity."). 
124 RAwLS, supra note 83, at 43. 
125 Id. at 44. 
126 RAwLS, supra note 7, at 73. 
127 See, e.g., PoGGE, supra note 26, at 167 ("The first ambiguity, then, concerns the kind of 
limitation Rawls want to impose upon socioeconomic inequalities that institutions allow to arise 
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sidestep this debate and explain how, whatever its precise meaning, the op-
portunity principle would operate for a Rawlsian in terms of contract law. 
It might seem obvious that the requirement of "careers open to talent" 
would exclude discrimination in employment contracts on grounds such as 
race or sex.129 There exists, however, a serious objection to such a conclu-
sion-namely that jobs might be described in ways that imply that race or sex 
are themselves construed as constitutive of "talent"-e.g., hiring for the posi-
tion of "male math teacher." Perhaps the Rawlsian response to the obvious 
concern of discrimination raised by such a job description is to draw a firm 
distinction between talents on the one hand (e.g., mathematical ability) and 
statuses on the other (e.g., sex)130-with employers allowed to discriminate 
on the basis of differential talents but not differential statuses. Such an an-
swer, however, could be objected to on the ground that it would seem to 
entail closing contracting options over an unduly broad range-for example, 
the hiring of someone beautiful to work as a model, or someone tall to act in 
a particular theatrical role portraying a basketball player. This is because, if 
the distinction between status and talent is to be maintained, beauty or height 
would seem to fall on the status side of the divide. In other words, once the 
Rawlsian differentiates between status and talent, she does not appear to 
have the resources to differentiate between the status of race or sex on the 
one hand and beauty or height on the other. 
We think that the discussion in the preceding paragraph is misleading, 
because it does not consider two possible Rawlsian solutions to the problem 
of this form of discrimination. First, bear in mind the post-institutional na-
ture of the Rawlsian legal system. Conceptions of what is and is not relevant 
to the requirement of "talent" for the Rawlsian could be constructed objec-
tively.131 Once such conceptions of relevance were employed, and talents 
relevant to specific jobs so described, employment descriptions, to be legiti-
mate, must limit themselves to naming relevant features of persons as "tal-
ents."132 In terms of contract law, then, a number of contracting options 
would be closed-specifically, those that attempted to contract in employ-
from social contingencies .... The second ambiguity concerns the question 'Equality or inequal-
ity of what?'"). 
12s Id. at 168 (presenting "four mutually incompatible readings of Rawls's democratic-
equality interpretation of the second principle, including four different versions of the opportu-
nity principle as it constrains the difference principle"); id. at 174-75 (presenting a fifth version 
of the opportunity principle). 
129 See RAWLS, supra note 45, at 363 ("[A]nnouncements of jobs and positions can be for-
bidden to contain agreements which exclude applicants of certain designated ethnic and racial 
groups, or of either sex, when these limitations are contrary to fair equality of opportunity."). 
130 Rawls does distinguish between "natural and social contingencies," see RAwLS, supra 
note 7, at 72, but Pogge points out that "[he] does not draw [the distinction] precisely," PoGGE, 
supra note 26, at 164. 
131 It is not obvious exactly what theoretical resources a Rawlsian has to draw upon in 
constructing such notions of relevance. Our narrow point is that some such construction must be 
possible if this approach is to work. 
132 See Alan H. Goldman, The Principle of Equal Opportunity, 15 S.J. PHIL. 473, 473 (1977) 
(discussing allocation "according to performance or predicted performance along some socially 
useful (nonarbitrary) scale .... Jobs, for example, are to be formally open to all strictly accord-
ing to their competence qualifications"). 
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ment on the basis of nontalents (i.e., subjective descriptions of talents). Thus, 
for example, if race were not constructed as a talent relevant to firefighting, 
the contracting option to hire "white firemen" would be closed. On the other 
hand, if beauty were constructed as a talent relevant to fashion modeling, the 
contracting options to discriminate on the basis of beauty in hiring fashion 
models would not be closed. But note that beauty might be constructed to be 
irrelevant to the hiring of a physician. 
The opportunity principle would thus mandate that some contracting op-
tions be closed. The difference principle, of course, might close some con-
tracting options that were not closed by the opportunity principle. For 
example, if the difference principle constructed a minimum wage require-
ment, the option of hiring firefighters at certain wages would be closed. In a 
sense, we can think of the opportunity principle as closing contracting op-
tions along the dimension of who can be contracted with (e.g., closing the 
option of contracting with white people simply because they are white), while 
the difference principle opens and closes contracting options along the di-
mension of what can be contracted over (e.g., if the difference principle man-
dates warranties of habitability in real estate transactions, then certain 
options will be closed). 
Note as well that because, for the Rawlsian, contracts are part of the 
basic structure, there can be no distinction between "public" and "private" 
spheres in terms of contracting. Though Rawls focused his comments regard-
ing the opportunity principle on "careers open to talents,"133 because (in our 
view) all of contract law is inside the basic structure, contracting options 
outside of employment (e.g., discrimination in housing or retail sales) might 
also be closed by the opportunity principle, again based on some objective 
standards of relevance constructed by the opportunity principle. 
There is a second possible solution to the conundrum raised by the ex-
ample given above featuring an employment description of "male math 
teacher." Given Rawls's assumptions of strict compliance to the principles of 
justice,134 the concern of pernicious discrimination might not loom large and 
therefore the objective construction of conceptions of relevance might not be 
necessary. In such a society citizens might opt, then, not to (initially) con-
struct contracting options involving subjective descriptions of talents as 
closed, hoping that discriminatory talent descriptions would be rare and not 
of any greater concern than is, say, discrimination on the basis of eye color in 
the contemporary United States.135 A coherent understanding of the oppor-
tunity principle would then be that the government would be duty bound to 
133 RAWLS, supra note 7, at 73. Interestingly, since Rawls is considering here a "market 
economy," id. at 72, the fact that employment contracts are subject to the demands of the oppor-
tunity principle would seem implicitly to reject, as a logical matter, the narrow conception of the 
basic structure. 
134 RAwLS, supra note 83, at 13 ("The limit (to our inquiry] is that we are concerned for the 
most part with the nature and content of justice for a well-ordered society. Discussion of this 
case is referred to in justice as fairness as ideal, or strict compliance, theory. Strict compliance 
means that (nearly) everyone strictly complies with, and so abides by, the principles of justice. 
We ask in effect what a perfectly just, or nearly just, constitutional regime might be like, and 
whether it may come about and be made stable under the circumstances of justice .... "). 
135 See generally Richard Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism and Preferential Treatment: An Ap-
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monitor whether pernicious and systematic effects to certain segments of so-
ciety arose due to the openness of contracting options.136 Were such discrep-
ancies to arise, the government would have the duty to close the appropriate 
contracting options. Presumably, this would be implemented via the creation 
of protected group status, although, in theory, no government action that did 
not violate the first principle of justice would be a priori precluded. So if, for 
example, private school instruction were found to inculcate sexist attitudes in 
students (an action, we will assume, not protected by the constitutional guar-
antees of freedom of thought and conscience) which created pernicious and 
systematic effects on female students' life prospects, state intervention would 
be required by the opportunity principle.137 
Conclusion 
In this Article, we have addressed the role of contract law in Rawlsian 
political philosophy. We maintain that despite the ambiguity in the Rawlsian 
texts concerning the scope of the two principles of justice and the controversy 
this ambiguity has engendered in the philosophical and legal literature, there 
exists a coherent conception of the basic structure available to Rawlsian po-
litical theory. Our view is that the narrow conception is objectionably arbi-
trary and that what we have called the medium and coercive conceptions are 
incoherent. We thus accept the truth of the broad view of the basic structure, 
which maintains that all aspects of society that affect life's prospects are 
properly understood as subject to the two principles of justice. Our conclu-
sions are bold. We argue that, given the truth of the broad conception, it 
follows that, contrary to the conventionally held narrow conception, contract 
law is within the basic structure. Therefore, in our view, Rawlsianism is not, 
as it is conventionally thought to be, neutral with regard to conceptions of 
contract law. In our view, contract law for the Rawlsian is governed (albeit 
indirectly) by the two principles of justice. A Rawlsian ought thus to accept 
as true the contract-as-distributive-justice conception of contract law. Thus, 
the Friedian or autonomy conception is incompatible with Rawlsian political 
philosophy. 
If we are correct in our argument concerning the broad conception of 
the basic structure, the door is open for a deeper understanding of the role 
that private law plays in Rawlsian political philosophy-it is no longer accu-
rate to believe that Rawlsianism is silent on matters of contract and private 
ordering, as has conventionally and historically been maintained. 
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136 Of course, it would appear that the government would also need to ensure that poten-
tial talents were nurtured (this would be true as well in the "construction of conceptions of 
relevance to talents" solution) but this lies outside the domain of contract law. 
137 Indeed, it appears to us that, contra Richard .Arneson, such intervention would be re-
quired even if the sexism took the form of reducing female students' ambitions. To do otherwise 
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